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Fourth Amendment doctrine is attentive to a wide range of interests, including
security, informational privacy, and dignity. How should courts reconcile these
competing concerns when deciding which searches and seizures are “unreason-
able”? Current doctrine typically answers this question by pointing to interest
aggregation: the various interests at stake are added up, placed on figurative
scales, and compared, with the goal of promoting overall social welfare. But
interest aggregation is disconnected from many settled doctrinal rules and
leads to results that are unfair for individuals. The main alternative is
originalism; but historical sources themselves suggest that the Fourth Amend-
ment calls for new moral reasoning.
This Article argues that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasona-
ble searches and seizures” is best understood, at least in large part, as a re-
quirement that police investigation be fair in the sense of being authorized by
principles that no rights holder could reasonably reject. This approach is in-
spired by “contractualist” moral philosophy and has several advantages. It
tracks widely held moral intuitions, comports with the Fourth Amendment’s
historical meaning, and resonates with underappreciated currents in extant
case law. In attending to the perspectives of individuals, contractualism gener-
ates rights that are not subject to interest aggregation. At the same time, con-
tractualism suggests a principled way to address new Fourth Amendment
questions, consistent with courts’ institutional role.
A contractualist approach to Fourth Amendment fairness suggests many ways
to refine or reform current doctrine. In terms of refinements, the contractualist
approach gives moral content to the notion of “individualized suspicion” by
showing when searches and seizures can be justified by a principle of individ-
ual responsibility. Contractualism also draws attention to other justifying
principles, such as a protection principle, and so explains how and when sus-
picionless searches and seizures are reasonable. Finally, the contractualist ap-
proach identifies areas where current Fourth Amendment doctrine is decidedly
unfair and ripe for reform, such as when courts limit rights to avoid diffuse
litigation costs, overemphasize “reasonable expectations of privacy,” and ig-
nore the unreasonableness of racial discrimination.
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Introduction
Does the Fourth Amendment have a first principle?1 Consider the fol-
lowing scenario, which is inspired by real events:
To detect, deter, and prosecute terrorists, the federal government develops
a surveillance program that uses cell-site location records to monitor the
public movements of almost everyone in major cities.2 A computer pro-
gram then mines the resulting population data to identify suspects for ad-
ditional police investigation.3 The program considers whether people are of
Arab descent, treating that factor as a reason for carrying out extra
investigation.4
This scenario raises many interconnected Fourth Amendment issues. The
government is pursuing an important antiterrorism interest. It is using an
algorithm to draw inferences from a large amount of arguably nonprivate
1. I focus here on the Reasonableness Clause. U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). On the Warrant Clause, see infra note 112 and
accompanying text.
2. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (2017); Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, Bloom-
berg Businessweek (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-
secret-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/7MHY-9RLA].
3. See Brian Kelly, St. Louis County Crime Prediction Program Marks One Year, CBS St.
Louis (Dec. 21, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2016/12/21/st-louis-county-crime-
prediction-program-marks-one-year/ [https://perma.cc/53SG-ZX2N].
4. See Anshel Pfeffer, In Israel, Racial Profiling Doesn’t Warrant Debate or Apologies,
Haaretz (Sept. 20, 2016, 7:20 PM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.743291 [https://
perma.cc/7KLY-Y9M8].
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information. And it is drawing racial categorizations. Competing concerns
include security, privacy, and equality. What principle can fairly balance
these interests and thereby disclose whether the scenario involves “unreason-
able searches and seizures”?5 What does it mean to say that something is
constitutionally “unreasonable,” anyway?6 Scholarship and case law suggest
three types of answer.
The first way to give meaning to “unreasonable searches and seizures”
involves recourse to history. The Supreme Court has said that the Fourth
Amendment secures, “at a minimum,” those rights protected by law at the
founding.7 The meaning of “unreasonable searches and seizures” is thus
partly frozen in time. But that ostensibly historical approach is itself histori-
cally dubious. In using open-ended language and referring to the ever-evolv-
ing common law notion of reasonableness, the Fourth Amendment
established a broad principle, rather than codifying any fixed set or version
of eighteenth-century doctrines.8 Moreover, it is hard to credit the idea that
founding-era law alone could answer the challenges posed by new social and
technological circumstances. In the face of new challenges, the only feasible
approach is to extract a principle from the Fourth Amendment and reason
based on it. The Court itself has recognized as much in framing history as
establishing only a “minimum” level of protection—not a maximum.9 And
in several cases involving new technologies, even the Court’s originalist ju-
rists have joined opinions that endeavored to reason about reasonableness.10
In short, recourse to history only defers the hard, unavoidable question of
just what makes a search or seizure “unreasonable.”
The second way to identify unreasonable searches and seizures is to en-
gage in some form of interest aggregation. Alas, the Court is not rigorous or
consistent in its use of interest aggregation. For instance, the Court is un-
clear what interests count or how they are to be compared. As a result, com-
mentators have variously glossed this aspect of the Court’s methodology as a
crude form of utilitarianism or cost–benefit analysis.11 For present purposes,
5. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Additional rights may flow from the Reasonableness
Clause’s apparently prophylactic use of “secure.”
6. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 61
(2017) (noting different conceptions).
7. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411.
10. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (engaging in interest aggre-
gation due to a lack of “more precise guidance from the founding era”).
11. E.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. Chi. Legal F.
163, 219 (“The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which balances interests
by fits and starts, could be described as ‘clunky utilitarianism.’ ”); Orin S. Kerr, An Economic
Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 623 (2016) (“The general
reasonableness standard . . . . is a thinly disguised cost–benefit analysis.”); Nadine Strossen,
The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1180–81 (1988) (“[T]he Court has evaluated an
increasing range of search and seizure issues on this ad hoc basis, according to a utilitarian
cost-benefit balancing calculus.”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
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however, the key is that the Court is often prepared to ascertain unreasona-
bleness by adding up benefits and costs and choosing the legal option that is
most likely to maximize overall welfare. For example, the Court routinely
rejects proposed Fourth Amendment rules because they would generate
costly litigation.12 These decisions assume that the propriety of searches and
seizures can be assessed based on the aggregate costs and benefits to society
at large.
Interest aggregation is problematic for several reasons. First, it conflicts
with widely held intuitions about the nature of Fourth Amendment rights.
For an interest aggregator, individual rights must sometimes be set aside for
the sake of social welfare. But the Fourth Amendment is often thought to
protect individuals from unfair burdens, even when those burdens are net
beneficial to society at large. Second, Fourth Amendment doctrine is charac-
terized by principles, like the individualized suspicion requirement, that are
in tension with interest aggregation and seem instead to have a deontological
foundation. Finally, interest aggregation puts the judiciary in a weak institu-
tional posture and so tilts the scales of justice toward the government.13 To
find Fourth Amendment violations, judges engaged in interest aggregation
must either question the government’s relatively expert view on issues of
social policy, or else conjure fears of governmental overreach. Either ap-
proach places the courts in the uncomfortable position of assuming the
worst about the elected branches.14
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 62 (1988) (“The reasonableness require-
ment suggests that individual searches be evaluated according to the standards imposed by act
utilitarianism.”); Ronald F. Wright, Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth
Amendment, 93 Yale L.J. 1127, 1141, 1141 n.73 (1984) (discussing act and rule utilitarianism
in the Fourth Amendment context).
12. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305–06 (1999) (demarcating the
Fourth Amendment search authority based in part on a feared “bog of litigation,” noting that
“[w]hen balancing the competing interests, our determinations of ‘reasonableness’ under the
Fourth Amendment must take account of these practical realities”); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (fashioning a warrant exception and worrying of “endless
litigation”).
13. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (2013)
(“[W]hen a court considers a balance of privacy interests against a government’s interest in
effective law enforcement, the government wins almost every time.”); Eve Brensike Primus,
Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 254, 296–97 (2011) (balancing
“systematically favors the government”); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 965 (1987) (“Balancing has been a vehicle primarily for
weakening earlier categorical doctrines restricting governmental power to search and seize.”);
Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820, 855 (1994)
(“[J]udgments couched in terms of ‘reasonableness’ slide very easily into the familiar constitu-
tional rubric of ‘rational basis’ review . . . .”); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 63
(“[O]nce the [Fourth] [A]mendment is reduced to a requirement that utilities be aggregated,
it loses much of its force as a technique for standing outside of normal politics.”); Wright,
supra note 11, at 1140 (“[A] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provides for minimum
protections cannot ground itself in act utilitarianism or balancing.”).
14. Cf. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 835 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (criticizing a dissenting opinion for “its alarmist tone and obligatory reference to
George Orwell’s 1984”).
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That leaves the third way of identifying “unreasonable searches and
seizures”—namely, to argue from deontological moral principles.15 This Ar-
ticle advances a version of that third approach by arguing that contractualist
moral principles should inform judicial application of the Fourth Amend-
ment’s Reasonableness Clause. Taking inspiration from T.M. Scanlon’s in-
fluential theory of moral permissibility,16 this Article contends that a search
or seizure is unreasonable when any principle that permitted it would be
one that a Fourth Amendment rights holder could reasonably reject. Thus,
competing interests are compared on a person-to-person basis, rather than
summed. This contractualist approach to Fourth Amendment fairness is
linked to reasonableness because both concepts are concerned with interper-
sonal justifiability. When a principle of conduct is fair or reasonable, people
can understand and respect the reasons behind it, even if the consequences
are to their own personal detriment.17 That approach is at odds with interest
aggregation. Oftentimes, an action that is net beneficial to society at large
might impose severe burdens on individuals and so be rejected as unfair.18
Contractualism thus draws our attention away from tallies of abstract inter-
ests and toward the perspective of the disadvantaged. More broadly, contrac-
tualism provides a way to justify and explore the intuition that the Fourth
Amendment affords strong individual rights, even against aggregated
interests.
Already, courts and litigants engage in theoretically thin moral reason-
ing when they engage in interest aggregation or raise deontological argu-
ments within the interstices of extant doctrine. This Article aims to surface
and refine those latent strands of moral reasoning. But precisely because it
rests on a moral theory, a contractualist Fourth Amendment has certain
limitations. While contractualist reasoning can often tell decisionmakers
which empirical questions to ask, it cannot reveal how to resolve disputed
15. For Fourth Amendment work that draws on deontological claims, see, for example,
Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a
“Pointless Indignity,” 66 Stan. L. Rev. 987 (2014); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and
Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456 (1996); Scott E.
Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and
Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751 (1994).
16. On Scanlon’s view, “an action is impermissible if any principle that permitted it
would be one that someone could reasonably reject.” T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions 99
(2008) [hereinafter Scanlon, Moral Dimensions]; see also T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe
to Each Other 153 (1998) [hereinafter Scanlon, What We Owe]. In adapting contractualist
reasoning to the Fourth Amendment, this Article goes beyond (and conceivably against) Scan-
lon’s own views.
17. Cf. Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Proce-
dural Justice, 123 Yale L.J.F. 525, 526–27 (2014) (“[T]he primary factor that people consider
when they are deciding whether they feel a decision is legitimate and ought to be accepted is
whether or not they believe that the authorities involved made their decision through a fair
procedure . . . .”).
18. Classic examples include forced gladiatorial combat for mass entertainment. See also
infra text accompanying note 68.
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points of fact. So whenever relevant empirical issues turn out to be con-
tested, a contractualist Fourth Amendment will be as well. Moreover, con-
tractualism is itself a contested view within philosophy, and some legal
scholars plausibly doubt than any one theory of the Fourth Amendment can
be entirely satisfactory.19 Yet contractualism can be useful for interpreters
who consider history and interest aggregation. Even if the Fourth Amend-
ment has no one master principle,20 contractualist reasoning can still operate
within Fourth Amendment doctrine, surfacing unfairness that would other-
wise be overlooked or brushed aside.21
Greater attention to contractualist reasoning would have many implica-
tions, including for the scenario outlined at the start of this Article. For
example, the approach advanced here suggests a basic distinction between
prosecuting crime and protecting individuals. When justifying searches or
seizures to pursue prosecutorial interests, the government generally relies on
a principle of responsibility and so cannot fairly use population-based (as
opposed to individualized) inferences.22 That conclusion not only under-
mines judicial decisions that rely on an individual’s presence in a “high
crime area,” but also establishes certain limits on “big data policing.”23 By
contrast, searches and seizures justified on preventive grounds rest on a pro-
tective principle that does allow consideration of population-based traits—
but only if the relevant burdens are properly distributed throughout soci-
ety.24 Contractualism also suggests that the Court has erred by: truncating
Fourth Amendment rights based on diffuse litigation costs,25 interposing
“reasonable expectations of privacy” as a common prerequisite for Fourth
Amendment protection,26 and denying that invidious racial discrimination
contravenes the Fourth Amendment.27
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I makes the case for a con-
tractualist approach to the Fourth Amendment. Parts II and III then respec-
tively deploy a contractualist framework to identify basic principles
governing when police act fairly and unfairly.
19. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 59 (citing Thomas Nagel, The View
from Nowhere 27 (1986)).
20. See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1149 (1998) (chal-
lenging the view that the Fourth Amendment has a master precept).
21. Some philosophers similarly argue that, despite its useful insights, contractualism
cannot supply a complete account of moral permissibility. E.g., Johann Frick, Contractualism
and Social Risk, 43 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 175, 220 (2015).
22. See infra Section II.A.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 126–127.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See infra Section I.C.
26. See infra Section II.D.
27. See infra Section III.C.
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I. Forms of Fairness
As used here, “fairness” is the demand that decisionmakers justify their
treatment of individuals, particularly when assigning burdens. As applied to
the Fourth Amendment, fairness calls for an account of why police are justi-
fied in imposing two kinds of burdens: “searches” and “seizures.” This Part
critically discusses well-recognized approaches grounded in history and in-
terest aggregation before outlining a new, third option inspired by contrac-
tualist thought.28
A. History
The Supreme Court and many commentators have suggested that his-
torical practices give content to the bar on “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”29 On this view, the Reasonableness Clause at least sometimes de-
mands the same “degree of protection” that the founders achieved via com-
mon law rules pertaining to “searches and seizures.”30
The threshold difficulty with historical approaches is a familiar one:
centuries-old answers do not often respond to present-day questions, as
even historically oriented justices recognize.31 But there is a deeper problem
with primarily relying on history in Fourth Amendment cases: historical
sources themselves suggest that the Fourth Amendment calls for new moral
reasoning.32 To wit, founding-era sources define “reasonable” as “agreeable
to reason” or “just.”33 And if the text’s reference to “unreasonable searches
28. The idea that morality and law are necessarily intermingled is perhaps most closely
associated with Dworkin’s theory of legal reasoning in terms of fit and justification. See Ron-
ald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). But a legal positivist can likewise attend to moral con-
siderations, particularly when resolving cases of legal underdeterminacy. See H.L.A. Hart,
The Concept of Law 204–05 (2d ed. 1994). Notably, no less authority than Chief Justice
Marshall used moral principles to resolve legal uncertainty. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 (1
Cranch) U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (emphasizing how “immoral” the Oath Clause would be, absent
judicial review).
29. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (“What
we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we believe must
provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.”); see also
infra note 34 (collecting historically oriented scholars).
30. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411.
31. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (“When history has not provided a conclusive answer, we
have analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional standards of reasonableness ‘by assess-
ing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.’ ” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))).
32. See generally David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1780 & n.251 (2000) (“The term ‘unreasonable,’ moreover, almost al-
ways meant in the late-eighteenth-century what it means today: contrary to sound judgment,
inappropriate, or excessive.”).
33. E.g., 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, W.
Strahan 3d ed. 1765) (1755) (unreasonable defined in part as “[n]ot agreeable to reason”); 2
Thomas Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language (London, Dodsley et
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and seizures” incorporated broad common law principles,34 then it also in-
corporated comparably broad moral concepts.35 So unlike constitutional
provisions that reflect specific judgments or implicate narrow values,36 the
Reasonableness Clause is plausibly read as an invitation for judicial reflec-
tion on the fairness of searches and seizures. Common law cases support
that conclusion, since they frequently considered how search-and-seizure
principles would affect third parties.37 Moreover, we will see that the Rea-
sonableness Clause’s evident concern with reason-giving resonates with con-
tractualism, which focuses on the justifiability of one’s actions to other
persons.38 Thus, there is a straightforward case for at least considering con-
tractualist insights on moral permissibility when implementing the Reasona-
bleness Clause.
The Fourth Amendment’s intellectual context also suggests that histori-
cally minded interpreters should undertake moral reasoning and, where pos-
sible, learn from moral philosophers. The common law was prized at the
founding not because it axiomatically defined reasonableness, but rather be-
cause it was the product of reasonableness or, more exactly, the product of
“artificial reason.”39 In referring to unreasonable searches and seizures, the
al. 1780) (defining reasonable in part as “just, rational, agreeable to reason”); see Laura K.
Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1273–74 (2016); Sklan-
sky, supra note 32, at 1780 n.252. Johnson gives an example from Swift that emphasizes rea-
son’s objectivity: “A law may be reasonable in itself, although a man does not allow it, or does
not know the reason of the lawgivers.” Johnson, supra.
34. For different views on how the common law should inform Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, see Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 St.
John’s L. Rev. 1097, 1118, 1120–21 (1998) (advancing a framework based in part on “com-
mon sense reasonableness”); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
Mich. L. Rev. 547, 686–93 (1999); and Donohue, supra note 33, at 1273–75. Analogous ques-
tions arise under other provisions. E.g., Martin S. Lederman, Of Spies, Saboteurs, and Enemy
Accomplices: History’s Lessons for the Constitutionality of Wartime Military Tribunals, 105 Geo.
L.J. 1529, 1591 (2017) (discussing the relationship between the common law and the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right).
35. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Mar-
shall Court Made More out of Less, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 787, 799 (1999) (noting that
American jurists “follow[ed] the lead of eighteenth-century British judges, especially Black-
stone and Lord Mansfield, in emphasizing the power of the courts to interpret the common
law in accord with equity, reason, and good sense”).
36. By way of illustration, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable
searches and seizures” is both more flexible than the Confrontation Clause’s fixed rule and
more ambitious than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’s minimalist standard. See
U.S. Const. amends. VI, VIII.
37. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (KB) (noting that the defend-
ants’ proposed rule “may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is
totally subversive of the liberty of the subject”).
38. See infra Section I.C.
39. Historical understandings of the common law are contested and complex. See Dono-
hue, supra note 33, at 1270 & n.513 (“[D]isagreement marks the precise source of such reason
(for example, custom, natural law, or Continental precepts).”); see also Frederick Mark
Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitu-
tionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 Emory L.J. 585, 609 (2009) (“A decision that had
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Fourth Amendment invoked the principles and aspirations that underlay the
common law—not the established common law rules that happened to exist
at that time. What Justice Antonin Scalia said of modern antitrust law is also
true of the Fourth Amendment’s reference to unreasonableness: “It invokes
the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common
law had assigned to the term” at any historical moment.40
So even without dictating adherence to any specific moral philosophy,
the Fourth Amendment contemplates that some moral theory will inevitably
come to bear. And if moral philosophy can shed new light on what qualifies
as “agreeable to reason” or “just,”41 then judges who implement those in-
sights can at least plausibly claim to fulfill the Fourth Amendment’s original
meaning.42
B. Interest Aggregation
When “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails,” the Court often assesses “the need to search” by adding up
the overall effects of any given search-and-seizure rule.43 This is interest ag-
gregation: instead of focusing on the distinctive perspectives of individuals,
the Court sums up costs and benefits, assessing “unreasonable searches and
seizures” from the impersonal standpoint of a social planner. Interest aggre-
gation is thus rights conferring only in the weak sense that it creates a proce-
dural right to judicial review of the political branches’ policy judgments.
Scholars have glossed the Court’s methodology as a kind of utilitarianism or
cost–benefit analysis.44 But Fourth Amendment interest aggregation is
hardly rigorous. The Court does not explain how to measure, sum, and
compare diverse interests. Nor is it clear whether the Court’s goal is to make
searches and seizures net beneficial or optimal. Regardless, interest aggrega-
tion, however specified, has three interrelated problems.45
‘reason’ or ‘right reason’ was ‘fitting’ in a dual sense, both consistent with customary prece-
dent, and expressive of a morally correct outcome.”); Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common
Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford U. Commonwealth L.J. 1 (2003); Sklansky, supra note
32, at 1782–93 (discussing common law and the Fourth Amendment).
40. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J.); see also
id. (noting the Sherman Act’s “dynamic potential”).
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (collecting sources).
42. The argument here could thus be viewed as consistent with some forms of original-
ism. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 1 (2015).
43. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–37 (1967). The idea of “balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails,” id. at 537, could be implemented
in a contractualist way by evaluating interests person-to-person, see infra Section I.C.
44. See supra note 11 (collecting sources).
45. Some scholars sometimes criticize courts for failing to tally all the nongovernmental
interests at stake and thereby doing bad interest aggregation. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The
Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 255, 277–78, 292–94 (2010)
(reading Atwater in this way). But the concern here is with the very goal of conditioning
Fourth Amendment rights on an aggregative analysis.
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The first problem is that interest aggregation allows individual interests
to be sacrificed for the sake of diffuse aggregated benefits, despite wide-
spread intuitions that the Fourth Amendment is a source of strong individ-
ual rights. In many contexts, interest aggregation generates results that are
morally objectionable, such as when an individual suffers a severe personal
burden to avert relatively small burdens for many people.46 That basic form
of unfairness is a pervasive challenge for Fourth Amendment law, as this
Article will go on to show. For now, however, a simple example will suffice.
Imagine that police decide to deter neighborhood shoplifting by arbitrarily
singling out a pedestrian, loudly treating him as a suspect, and subjecting
him to an embarrassing or harmful full-body search. That tactic could in
principle yield a net increase in social welfare—if the cumulative benefits of
deterring shoplifters outweighed the harm to the unfortunate individual. A
defender of interest aggregation might challenge the relevant empirics,47 but
that kind of defense would only sidestep the deeper point: even if interest
aggregation clearly favored making an example out of an arbitrarily chosen
person, that tactic would be unjustified from the perspective of the individ-
ual and therefore unfair.
The second problem is closely related: interest aggregation cannot easily
explain foundational and intuitively attractive features of current Fourth
Amendment doctrine.48 Perhaps the most salient example is the general re-
quirement of individualized suspicion.49 While there are important excep-
tions to this requirement, the Fourth Amendment frequently prohibits
police from searching or seizing an individual unless the police have sub-
stantial reason to believe that the specific search or seizure will turn up evi-
dence of a crime.50 That requirement is in tension with interest aggregation:
as the shoplifting example above illustrates, searches can advance aggregate
social interests even when there is no reasonable belief that evidence will be
uncovered.51 The Court’s skepticism of suspicionless searches and seizures
seems rooted in the intuition that there is a personal right at stake. Interest
aggregation does not reason in that deontological register.
46. See infra text accompanying note 68.
47. Cf. Kerr, supra note 11, at 608 (arguing that suspicion requirements often cause po-
lice to internalize negative externalities).
48. On nonaggregative themes, see David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How
Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 1069, 1111 (2014)
(noting arguments “that privacy matters either for non-consequentialist reasons, usually per-
taining to the deontological value of dignity, or because of the harms suffered by people whose
privacy is not respected”); see also Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 Mich. L.
Rev. 761, 770 & n.25 (2012) (collecting cases).
49. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or seizure
is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”); United
States v. Paetsch, 782 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 2015).
50. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 749 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment) (collecting cases using the phrase “individualized suspicion”).
51. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 11, at 62 (citing Richard A. Posner, Rethink-
ing the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49, 74–75) (“Neither the warrant nor the
probable cause requirement is fully compatible with this [utilitarian] standard. For example,
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The final problem with interest aggregation is that it places the judiciary
in a weak institutional position vis-à-vis the other branches and so may lead
to unduly weak enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights. This basic con-
cern is often framed as a criticism of Fourth Amendment balancing as such:
courts seem to privilege governmental interests over the individual interests
of persons who are searched or seized.52 Interest aggregation threatens to
exacerbate this form of governmental favoritism. Because it calls for consid-
eration of overall social well-being, interest aggregation blurs with conven-
tional policy planning—which is the traditional province of the political
branches. When it comes to wide-ranging assessments of policy conse-
quences, courts lack the expertise and broad fact-finding abilities typically
enjoyed by the political branches. Fourth Amendment interest aggregation is
also politically problematic, both because overt judicial policymaking is ar-
guably illegitimate and because courts generally lack the political branches’
ability to claim democratic support. Moreover, all these difficulties are at
their apogee in the law enforcement and national security cases where the
Fourth Amendment operates. Thus, interest aggregation suggests that courts
will tread lightly when reviewing searches and seizures approved by the po-
litical branches. Put more sharply, courts that view their role in terms of
interest aggregation will tend to underprotect Fourth Amendment rights.
So while it is more adaptable than historical approaches and consistent
with significant aspects of current doctrine, the Court’s professed interest
aggregation ultimately offers a problematic basis for Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Even if more sophisticated aggregative theories could mitigate the
problems identified above, it is worthwhile to pursue another, more direct
solution—namely, the possibility that a deontological approach might better
account for our moral intuitions regarding “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”
C. Contractualism
A contractualist approach to Fourth Amendment fairness would require
that search-and-seizure principles be immune to reasonable rejection by any
affected rights holder.53 This approach is opposed to interest aggregation:
under contractualism, individual interests are compared on a person-to-per-
son basis, rather than summed.
The intuition underlying contractualism is that conduct should be
based on principles that are fair in the sense of being reasonably justifiable
searches on less than probable cause might maximize utility if the value of the evidence, dis-
counted by the improbability of finding it, outweighs the privacy costs associated with the
search.”).
52. See supra note 13 (collecting sources).
53. See supra note 16. The main text focuses on reasonable rejections by rights holders
based on the doctrinal assumption that the Fourth Amendment protects only “the people.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (limiting
Fourth Amendment protections to “the people”).
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to each individual.54 Of course, moral principles will not in fact receive uni-
versal assent, in part because people often unfairly insist on maximizing
their own interests, no matter the cost to others. The morally relevant task,
however is to identify when it is reasonable to reject a search-and-seizure
principle. A reasonable rejection must rest on the kinds of interests that
people generally have, such as their safety,55 and must have the goal of
achieving agreement on terms of mutual justifiability.56 That basic demand
precludes rejections based on spite or negotiation strategy. Further, a search
for mutual justifiability requires that each person’s grounds for rejection be
compared with other individuals’ countervailing reasons.57 So instead of ad-
ding up all benefits and burdens across persons, contractualism calls for a
series of one-to-one comparisons: each person asserts her own interests, and
the competing individual interests are then compared.58 All other things be-
ing equal, contractualism privileges those individuals who have the greatest
personal interests at stake. Finally, reasonable rejections are directed at prin-
ciples of conduct, as opposed to one-off actions.59 Rejections must therefore
account for how the principle at issue affects the rejecting individual over
the course of her whole life.60 Thus, an individual could not reasonably ac-
cept a principle today based on its long-term benefits, but then opportunis-
tically reject it on occasions when it proves personally burdensome.61
A contractualist approach would call for a fundamental perspectival re-
orientation in Fourth Amendment thinking. A slew of Supreme Court
precedents suggest that the ultimate question under the Fourth Amendment
is whether an officer is reasonable in performing the search or seizure at
54. The main text adapts Scanlon’s view that “an action is impermissible if any principle
that permitted it would be one that someone could reasonably reject.” Scanlon, Moral
Dimensions, supra note 16, at 99; see also Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 153.
55. See Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 204 (discussing “generic” reasons).
56. See id. at 213–17.
57. See id.
58. Contractualism complicates the distinction between individual and “collective”
Fourth Amendment rights. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
Minn. L. Rev. 349, 367 (1974); see also David Gray, The Fourth Amendment in an Age of
Surveillance 155–56 (2017) (characterizing the Fourth Amendment as a “collective right”).
Contractualism is individualist in that it focuses on the perspectives of individuals, but also
collective in that it considers the perspectives of all rights holders. So contractualism does not
limit consideration to any single officer or suspect, but neither does it attend to “ ‘the people’
as a whole.” Gray, supra at 155–56.
59. See supra note 54.
60. Thus, contractualism calls for “intrapersonal aggregation,” or aggregation “within
each person’s life.” Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 237.
61. Relatedly, contractualism’s weighing of individual interests accounts for the ex ante
probability (or improbability) that an individual will suffer any given burden. See infra note
143 (discussing “ex ante contractualism”).
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issue.62 That framing expressly adopts the “standpoint”63 or “perspective” of
the officer “on the scene,”64 rather than the perspective of any other person,
such as persons who are subject to future searches or seizures.65 This officer-
oriented approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness resembles the re-
medial doctrine of qualified immunity, which is avowedly designed to pro-
tect reasonable officers from personal liability for unconstitutional searches
and seizures.66 Yet the evident similarity between Fourth Amendment law
and qualified immunity jurisprudence should give us pause, for the first
question posed by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable
searches and seizures” is not whether the officer should ultimately be held
liable for damages. Nor is the goal of the Fourth Amendment to find the
outer limits of what some subset of “reasonable officers” would tolerate.
Rather, the key Fourth Amendment question is—or should be—whether
police actions are morally acceptable to rights holders, especially people who
bear the burdens of searches or seizures.67
Scanlon provides a now-famous example of how contractualism di-
verges from interest aggregation. Imagine that the only way to broadcast a
thrilling sports match to millions of viewers is to allow an unfortunate engi-
neer (the victim of an industrial accident) to be painfully electrocuted
throughout the event.68 Interest aggregation would presumably favor a prin-
ciple allowing the broadcast, at least under some circumstances: if we add up
62. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“The principal compo-
nents of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which
occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable sus-
picion or to probable cause.” (emphasis added)); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)
(“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” (emphasis
added)).
63. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696.
64. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
65. For critical perspectives on the Court’s use of Fourth Amendment perspective, see
Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 677,
677 (1998); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 946,
968–69 (2002); Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
71 (2007); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 1229 (1983); and Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A
Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment, 17 Tex. J. Women & L. 153, 187 (2008). See also
infra note 67.
66. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
67. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Demo-
cratic Society 195 (Quid Pro Books, 4th ed. 2011) (1966) (“[B]ehavior that seems reasona-
ble to the police because of the character of the neighborhood is seen by the honest citizen in it
as irresponsible and unreasonable. About her, more errors will necessarily be made under a
reasonableness standard.”). While ultimately concerned with the perspectives of rights holders,
a fairness analysis can generate requirements that police exercise due care, given information
available to them. See, e.g., infra Section I.A.
68. Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 235.
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the interests of enough happy viewers, their aggregated interests will eventu-
ally outweigh the interests of the engineer. Yet that result is intuitively objec-
tionable, and contractualism helps to explains why. The engineer’s
individual interests in being saved from excruciating pain is very large,
whereas each audience member has only a relatively small entertainment
interest in continuing to see the match.69 Because contractualism calls for
directly comparing those individual objections, rather than summing them
up, the engineer could reasonably reject a principle that allowed for his elec-
trocution. In this way, contractualism respects the separateness of persons—
that is, the irreducible experiences and claims of each person.70
To illustrate how a court might implement Fourth Amendment contrac-
tualism, consider the Court’s 5–4 decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
where the plaintiff had been arrested, separated from her children, and
jailed—all for driving without a seatbelt, an offense punishable only by a
$50 fine.71 The plaintiff argued that her arrest yielded substantial social costs
and no benefits.72 The Court appeared to agree, at least on the facts of that
case.73 In the Court’s view, however, “a reasonable Fourth Amendment bal-
ance” should “credit the government’s side with an essential interest in read-
ily administrable rules.”74 The plaintiff’s proposal would yield inadequate
guidance in other cases and so “would guarantee increased litigation over
many of the arrests that would occur.”75 Based largely on these diffuse third-
party litigation costs, the Court found that interest aggregation favored the
government.76
A Fourth Amendment contractualist would reason about this scenario
in a different way. The first step is to propose a principle that would author-
ize the actions at issue. Consider Principle X, which approximates the legal
holding adopted in Atwater: “When a police officer has good reason to be-
lieve that an individual has committed a fine-only offense, the officer may
arrest that individual, even if the arrest harms the suspect and third-par-
ties.”77 The next step is to determine whether Principle X is subject to rea-
sonable rejection. A prospective arrestee could object to Principle X because
it would expose her to severe personal burdens. Moreover, the children of
69. See id. at 235.
70. See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 23–24 (rev. ed. 1999). Rawls’s the-
ory of justice is focused on the “basic structure” of society. By comparison, Scanlon’s contrac-
tualism is concerned with interpersonal ethics and so is more readily applied to Fourth
Amendment questions.
71. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
72. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345–47. Atwater also raised a historical argument. Id. at
326–27.
73. See id. at 346–47 (“If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested
facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail . . . . [Her] claim to live free of pointless indignity
and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her case.”).
74. Id. at 347.
75. See id. at 350.
76. Id. at 350–51 & n.21.
77. See id. at 354.
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prospective arrestees could raise a similar objection. Thus, many individuals
have a strong personal basis for rejecting Principle X. And it is hard to see
how any other individual would have any reasonable basis for insisting on
Principle X, particularly because rejecting the principle would preserve am-
ple means of enforcing compliance with the law, such as by issuing a ticket.
Given this person-to-person comparison of individual interests, Principle X
can reasonably be rejected. Searches and seizures that rely on Principle X are
thus unfair and unreasonable.78
But what about the Court’s argument that a ruling for Atwater would
substantially increase litigation costs?79 Even if the Court’s dire assessment of
litigation costs were correct, the Court’s decision would still be unfair to
people like the plaintiff and her children. Again, contractualism asks
whether any rights holder has an individual reason to insist on Principle X
that is stronger than another rights holder’s reason for rejecting the princi-
ple. Here, no actual individual experiences the welfare maximization of the
Court’s interest aggregation. Perhaps a multitude of affected individuals
would experience a modest reduction in their expected litigation costs—a
significant benefit, to be sure, but one that pales in comparison to the per-
sonal burdens imposed on the Atwater plaintiff, her children, and people like
them. Thus, the Court’s interest aggregation cannot save Principle X from
reasonable rejection. A defender of Atwater might argue that some other
search-and-seizure principle is both immune to reasonable rejection and
supportive of the arrest in Atwater. That new candidate principle would then
have to be tested, yielding an iterative process of moral reasoning. But once a
decisionmaker is satisfied that no search-and-seizure principle both autho-
rizes the conduct at issue and is immune to reasonable rejection, then the
underlying conduct should be deemed unfair as well as unreasonable for
Fourth Amendment purposes.
Because of its perspectival shift, contractualism helpfully prevents the
most burdened individuals from being lost in the shuffle.80 By contrast, in-
terest aggregation creates the possibility that large aggregate benefits could
swamp any countervailing individual interests. We have already seen an im-
portant example of this point: interest aggregation objectionably leaves open
the possibility of imposing concentrated burdens on an arbitrarily selected
individual who is made an example of, in order to achieve diffuse benefits in
78. Mitch Berman has insightfully argued that while Atwater purported to decide what is
“unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment, it is better viewed as establishing a “decision
rule” that governs how to go about ascertaining unreasonableness. Mitchell N. Berman, Con-
stitutional Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 108–13 (2004). Berman notes that “per se analysis
seems inconsistent with the very concept of reasonableness.” Id. at 110. However, “per se” or
rule-like Fourth Amendment principles may themselves be reasonable and fair, as discerned
via contractualist analysis.
79. See id. at 311 (discussing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350).
80. See T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in The Difficulty of Toler-
ance: Essays in Political Philosophy 124, 145 (2003) (“Under contractualism, when we
consider a principle our attention is naturally directed first to those who would do worst
under it.”).
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the form of crime reduction.81 But there are many other examples. As we
will see, Fourth Amendment contractualism is committed to avoiding
search-and-seizure burdens that may be net beneficial to society but are
nonetheless unfair because they are disproportionately focused on certain
individuals, such as members of disfavored racial groups or the poor.82
Some readers may worry that a contractualist analysis would place un-
realistic burdens on police by requiring them to imagine and then balance
the competing interests of an indefinite number of rights holders. But the
appropriate analysis for a court is not necessarily the same as what police
would or should do in the field. Courts often craft operational rules based
on deeper normative inquiries that no official would ever perform.83 Like-
wise, a contractualist approach to the Fourth Amendment can inform famil-
iar legal standards like probable cause without demanding that police engage
in the same first-principles moral reasoning. Contractualism’s perspectival
shift is also consistent with the imaginative demands routinely placed on
courts. Judges must often strive to place themselves in the shoes of diverse
people affected by the law. And that means attending to unfamiliar perspec-
tives—a duty aided by the judicial process and diversity on the bench.84
Heuristics can also facilitate contractualist reasoning about Fourth Amend-
ment rights, such as viewing the legal issue from a suspect’s perspective.85
Readers may also be understandably hesitant about extending a moral
theory like contractualism to the Fourth Amendment—particularly when
scholars have forcefully argued that interest aggregation better explains at
least some important moral intuitions.86 But even if contractualism has im-
portant limitations,87 it can still shed light on Fourth Amendment questions
by drawing attention to moral intuitions that might otherwise go unap-
preciated. Moreover, contractualist reasoning is particularly well suited to
81. See supra text accompanying note 47.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 189; infra Section III.C.
83. Almost any major Fourth Amendment ruling supplies an example. E.g., Riley v. Cali-
fornia, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Berman, supra note 78. Note that, as the above discussion of
Atwater illustrates, any tradeoffs involved in making “administrable” Fourth Amendment rules
should themselves be reviewed under a contractualist analysis.
84. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 115–17 (2008); Joy Milligan,
Note, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Mo-
rality, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1206 (2006).
85. See also supra note 80 (explaining that contractualism naturally draws attention to
the most burdened individuals). For a recent example, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 28,
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (No. 15–1485) (viewing the legal issue
“from the point of view of the reasonable partygoer” rather than only “through the eyes of the
officer”).
86. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?, 16 J. Eth-
ics 39 (2012); infra note 183. For example, Frick imagines a scenario where either one mine
worker can be saved from certain death, or the working conditions of one thousand miners
can be improved such that twenty statistical lives will be saved. Frick, supra note 21, at 218–19.
87. Somewhat similarly, Frick concludes that contractualism, though illuminating, can-
not capture all wrong-making properties of actions. Frick, supra note 21, at 220 (discussing a
similar thought in 3 Derek Parfit, On What Matters 368–70 (2011)).
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analysis of “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Even if interest aggregation
is both moral and constitutional in many areas of policymaking, individual-
ist considerations and interpersonal justifiability are thought to have unu-
sual force when Fourth Amendment rights are at stake. As we will see,
contractualism’s focus on the perspectives of individuals allows it to respect
the “separateness of persons,” honor deontological undercurrents in Fourth
Amendment doctrine, and assign courts a traditional rights-enforcing role
distinct from the political branches’ frequent pursuit of aggregate interests.
To bear out those claims, however, we need to apply contractualist reasoning
to search-and-seizure questions and see how it fits. The next Part begins that
work by using contractualist reasoning to derive several morally grounded
search-and-seizure principles.
II. Sources of Fairness
Many dilemmas in Fourth Amendment law stem from a failure to disen-
tangle the different justifications that can give rise to fair Fourth Amend-
ment searches and seizures. For example, courts frequently use the same
doctrinal concepts—such as “probable cause,” “exigency,” and “reasonable
suspicion”—not only for searches and seizures that endeavor to identify
crimes for purposes of prosecution, but also for police actions that are for-
ward looking in that they seek to avoid threatened harm. But the moral
issues posed by these different justifications are fundamentally different. Any
effort to understand Fourth Amendment fairness must therefore look be-
neath the doctrinal categories and tease apart different moral justifications
for searches and seizures.
This Part explores five separate kinds of justification that are critically
relevant to the Fourth Amendment: responsibility, protection, consent, curi-
osity, and helpfulness.88 These principles identify conditions that presump-
tively give rise to fair searches and seizures. Each principle can apply
independent of the others, and more than one may apply in a single case.
However, the principles in themselves are not conclusive of reasonableness.
Even when sources of fairness apply, additional moral considerations might
nonetheless render searches and seizures unfair—a topic to be explored in
more detail in Part III.
A. Responsibility
After exercising due care in concluding that an individual is responsible
for a crime, the police are generally justified in imposing search-and-seizure
88. Even nuanced treatments tend to distill the government’s justificatory interests into
binaries. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The
Protections for Policing, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 281, 286 (2016) (“Policing has a binary nature
to it—a division both natural and intuitive. When policing agencies police, they do one of two
things: (1) they investigate, and (2) they seek, in a programmatic or regulatory way, to curb a
social problem.”).
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burdens that effectuate the individual’s punishment. This intuitive idea is
the “principle of responsibility.”
Contractualism makes room for the widespread deontological intuition
that personal choices are relevant to responsibility and, therefore, to the bur-
dens that can fairly be placed on individuals.89 Scanlon’s main example in-
volves a community project to remove hazardous waste: the project advances
diffuse public health interests, but bystanders who encounter the waste while
it is in transit might be severely injured.90 The bystanders could accordingly
object to a principle that would expose them to such a serious harm. To
address that objection, the community warns people to stay away from the
vehicles conveying the waste. That public announcement would undermine
the bystanders’ reasonable ability to object to the project. Assuming that all
due warnings issue, then bystanders would have an adequate opportunity to
choose appropriately and avoid harm. Anyone who nonetheless approached
the vehicles would be responsible for his injuries and so could not reasona-
bly reject a principle allowing the project.91
This example illustrates a broader point about how responsibility oper-
ates within contractualist reasoning. As Scanlon puts it: “[I]f a person has
had an opportunity to avoid a loss by choosing appropriately, then this di-
minishes the complaint that he or she could make against a principle per-
mitting others to act in ways that lead to that loss’s occurring.”92 A finding
of responsibility can thus justify the imposition of concentrated burdens that
are necessary to advance diffuse interests. Scanlon himself argues that an
individual’s choice to violate a justified criminal law can undermine his abil-
ity to reject principles of punishment, thereby rendering the resulting pun-
ishments fair.93
Building on Scanlon’s brief account of criminal law, we might imagine
that someone violates a law against driving with an expired license. Is it
unfair to punish that individual, such as by imposing a fine? Put in contrac-
tualist terms, could the driver reasonably reject Principle Y, which autho-
rizes punishment for driving with an expired license? There is reason to
think the answer is no. Many drivers could reasonably insist on having a
89. Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 294. Scanlon is at pains not to rely on a
“forfeiture” approach rooted in voluntariness or retribution. See id. at 251–56. Scanlon instead
grounds the idea of responsibility in “the Value of Choice,” or the personal interest in having
the opportunity to make choices that affect oneself. See id. at 263–67.
90. Id. at 256–58.
91. Id. at 259. On Scanlon’s “Value of Choice” account, an opportunity to choose is “just
another means through which the likelihood of injury is reduced.” Id. at 257. Thus, responsi-
bility can sometimes obtain even when there is no “conscious decision to ‘take the risk,’ ” such
as if someone in the main-text example approached the dangerous vehicles because they
“failed to hear about the danger” or “simply forgot.” Id. at 257–59.
92. Id. at 294; see id. at 263–64 (discussing the justifiability of criminal punishments that
advance an “important social goal”).
93. See id. at 265 (“A person who knowingly and intentionally violates a justifiable law
lays down his or her right not to suffer the prescribed punishment: that is to say, such a person
has no legitimate complaint against having this penalty inflicted.”).
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licensing scheme as a means of promoting safety and other interests. And if
the driver had an opportunity to avoid punishment by choosing appropri-
ately—a key assumption—then he would have only a diminished basis for
objecting based on his own punishment.94 By contrast, punishment would
be unfair if drivers had not been afforded notice of the renewal requirement
or if there were no practicable way for an individual to renew his license.
This link between choice and punishment helps to explain why strict liability
offenses are relatively difficult to justify: by eliminating mens rea elements,
strict liability offenses diminish individuals’ opportunity to avoid punish-
ment by choosing appropriately—that is, by making lawful choices.95 So ei-
ther another justificatory principle must come into play or else some other
form of responsibility must be found, such as a decision to join a line of
work with notice of its special burdens.96
But how is the government to know when an individual is responsible
for a crime? That practical difficulty creates the need for an auxiliary princi-
ple: the idea of due care. In general, punitive principles that depend on a
finding of personal responsibility require safeguards to protect people who
are not responsible and to encourage lawfulness. Return to Principle Y. As
we have seen, fines for driving without a license are justifiable; but a punitive
principle that afforded drivers no reliable adjudicatory process could reason-
ably be rejected by innocent people placed at risk of suffering unjustified
burdens. To avoid that objection, Principle Y requires safeguards—such as
notice, due process, and a presumption of innocence—that “enhance the
value of choice as a protection.”97 When in place, the safeguards empower
people to avoid punishment by choosing to abide by the law. Because those
safeguards are imperfect, some drivers will still suffer fines even when they
are not responsible for having an expired license. But demanding perfection
would in practice preclude all punishment and so could itself be reasonably
rejected by people with an interest in the licensing system that the punish-
ments support. Fairness thus demands that safeguards for the innocent be
adequate after considering all relevant perspectives. In other words, the gov-
ernment’s finding that an individual is responsible for a crime can be fair
only if based on due care.98
94. We will see that searches and seizures can be justified by the protection principle
even when the burdened party is not responsible. See infra Section II.B. If police know that a
bomb has been slipped into a passenger’s luggage, for example, the passenger can fairly be
searched even if she is concededly innocent of any wrongdoing.
95. Cf. Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 266 (noting that punishment for
“morally unobjectionable activities” is “more difficult to justify”).
96. See id. (suggesting the possibility that “just [ ] going into the milk business . . .
involves laying down one’s (legal) right not to be penalized in the event that the milk one sells
turns out to be impure even though one has not been negligent”).
97. Id. at 264 (specifically noting “due process” and notice, among other things).
98. Id. (discussing these “safeguards”).
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The contractualist reasoning that supports criminal punishments can be
extended to investigation.99 Consider Principle Z, which would authorize in-
vestigative detentions where police have concluded, based on due care, that a
suspect is engaged in a bank robbery. A bank robber would have an obvious
interest in rejecting this principle to avoid the severe personal burdens of
punishment, but the robber’s responsibility would undermine that basis for
reasonable rejection: had the robber chosen appropriately, his risk of being
burdened would greatly decline. Moreover, other individuals have a strong
interest in bringing bank robbers to justice. Given that comparison of indi-
vidual interests, bank robbers could not reasonably reject Principle Z based
on their admittedly high risk of suffering investigative burdens.
What about people who are innocent of bank robbery? Could they rea-
sonably reject Principle Z? On the one hand, innocent individuals would
have an interest in rejecting the principle, since even investigation that ex-
hibits due care will sometimes be misdirected. The most diligent investiga-
tors can make mistakes, and people can be wrongly identified or simply turn
up in the wrong place at the wrong time. So Principle Z creates a risk that at
least some innocent individuals will be erroneously stopped on suspicion of
being responsible for bank robbery. On the other hand, innocent individuals
also have an interest in bringing bank robbers to justice, including for rea-
sons of safety, and Principle Z promotes those interests.100 Which of these
conflicting individual interests should prevail? The idea of responsibility
alone cannot answer that question, since we are focused now on the inno-
cent—that is, on people who are not responsible for crime.
At this point, we must turn to the auxiliary principle of due care: when
does an investigative principle primarily founded on responsibility feature
adequate safeguards to protect the innocent from police error? To answer
that question, contractualism calls for weighing the individual interests in
holding wrongdoers responsible against individual interests in avoiding the
burdens that stem from fruitless searches and seizures. By insisting on a
relatively demanding standard of due care, individuals who abide by the law
can reduce their odds of suffering investigative burdens. And once potential
suspects face a sufficiently small risk of suffering those burdens, individuals
99. Police investigation could be viewed as the pre-trial stage of the criminal process—a
view that accords with the tendency to refer to Fourth Amendment law as a part of “criminal
procedure.” See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1885,
1894–97 (2014); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.23 (1984) (citing Ar-
nold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 Mich. L.
Rev. 1229 (1983)).
100. I assume that police seek to enforce criminal laws that are justified. See supra text
accompanying note 93 (outlining a contractualist argument for criminal law). But when crimi-
nal enforcement is unjustified, the principle of responsibility would not justify searches and
seizures to prosecute those crimes. For a Rawlsian account of legitimate criminal punishment,
see Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 307,
314 (2004) (“If the exercise of state power in a liberal democracy is to be legitimate, that is, it
must be justifiable in terms that all members of society subject to that power would accept as
just and fair.”), and id. at 386–89 (objecting to certain forms of punishment for “non-serious
offenses”).
June 2018] Fourth Amendment Fairness 1429
who benefit from law enforcement can reasonably insist on preserving the
police’s investigative powers. So just as the innocent can reasonably reject
trial principles that expose them to an undue risk of being convicted, the
innocent can also reasonably reject investigative principles that expose them
to an undue risk of being searched or seized.
We can identify some general features of due care. A principle requiring
certainty of guilt would place an impossible burden on police, and so could
reasonably be rejected by individuals who depend on law enforcement.101 At
the opposite extreme, innocent individuals could reasonably reject principles
that exposed them to a high risk of suffering burdens. Examples include
principles allowing police to attribute responsibility based on no evidence at
all or when all available evidence indicates that someone else is exclusively
responsible.102 Relatedly, the principle of responsibility would not allow po-
lice to pursue diffuse benefits by making an example of an arbitrarily se-
lected individual, as interest aggregation might allow.103 Beyond those
general points, the practical content of “due care” will necessarily vary based
on the circumstances. Again, a contractualist approach must consider di-
verse perspectives and competing interests. Therefore, due care must safe-
guard the interests of individuals who are disproportionately likely to
experience investigative burdens.104 This analysis is also attentive to whether
any given principle would create a risk of imposing burdens based on inno-
cent conduct that individuals regularly have reason to undertake, such as
residing in dorms, wearing jackets or attending parties.105
101. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (“To be reasonable is not to
be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government
officials . . . .”). Perfect knowledge of an apparent bank robber’s responsibility may well be
impossible even after trial. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (noting the “be-
yond a reasonable doubt” standard).
102. This conclusion addresses a classic law school hypothetical: if police know only that a
suspect retreated into one of several indistinguishable apartments, can they forcibly enter them
all to find the suspect? Not fairly—at least, not unless a protective interest is at play. See infra
Section II.B; see also Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas III, Criminal Procedure:
Principles, Policies and Perspectives 203–04 (6th ed. 2017); Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities
in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 2010, at 69, 76 (reflecting on “whether a one-in-three probability is sufficient to make
up probable cause”); Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the
Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 465, 497 (1984) (finding probable cause
for all of ten suspects, where an unknown one among them is known to be an offender).
103. See supra text accompanying note 47 (explaining this point).
104. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 Law & Contemp. Probs., Sum-
mer 2010, at 107, 124–25 (“[I]magine you are a Mexican American in Southern California
who is subjected to document checks on major highways far from the border, or . . . . an
inner-city resident subject to routine checkpoint stops as you walk around your own neighbor-
hood, or an Arab American who is tracked on camera . . . because a data-mining program
indicates that you fit a terrorist profile.” (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 67 (noting
this feature of contractualism); infra Section III.C (on invidious discrimination).
105. See Richard M. Re, DC v. Wesby and Fourth Amendment Perspective, Prawfsblawg
(Nov. 2, 2017, 12:19 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/11/dc-v-wesby-
and-fourth-amendment-perspective.html [https://perma.cc/GX3T-NRZW] (parties); infra text
accompanying notes 121 (dorms) and 130 (jackets).
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The Fourth Amendment can be viewed as a means of achieving the due
care that fairness demands of police. Take the probable cause requirement.
Courts and commentators struggle to express that test in probabilistic
terms,106 and there is authority, as well as thoughtful scholarship, discourag-
ing use of probabilistic reasoning at all.107 To this day, the case law rests on
the normatively laden maxim that probable cause is sufficient information
“to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been or is being committed.”108 Contractualism helps to explain why the
probable cause standard is hard to quantify: it reflects an adaptive ethical
principle rather than a fixed statistical threshold. In other words, police have
sufficient confidence of individual responsibility when they act pursuant to
principles of due care that no individual could reasonably reject. Again, the
appropriate level of confidence may vary depending on the risk of misidenti-
fying the responsible party and the personal interests advanced by identify-
ing violators of the law at issue.109 The warrant rule is also relevant.110
Because they require judicial approval, warrants curb police discretion and
reduce the risk to innocent people that police will incorrectly find individual
responsibility.111 If warrants are key to preventing police from wrongly as-
signing responsibility, then potential suspects could reasonably reject search-
and-seizure principles that lack a warrant rule or similar safeguard of due
care.112
The principle of responsibility also helps to explain and justify the gen-
eral requirement of individualized suspicion, which seems to defy basic
106. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause stan-
dard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”); Christopher Slobogin, The
World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 39 (1991) (arguing that probable
cause is “somewhat lower” than a preponderance).
107. See supra note 106; see also Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable
Cause, in The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J.
Stuntz 131 (Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012).
108. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (cleaned up); Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (same); see also Florida v. Harris, 568
U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (similar); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); Locke v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 342 (1813) (similar).
109. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (applying a lower suspi-
cion standard for less intrusive police actions).
110. E.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) (warrant rule).
111. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452, 464 (1932); see also William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77
Va. L. Rev. 881, 884 (1991).
112. For more on reasonableness and warrants, see infra text accompanying notes 166,
275. These points accord with the view that the Warrant Clause simply precludes warrants
without probable cause, without requiring them. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 771 (1994).
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probabilistic reasoning.113 Jane Bambauer gives a helpful example.114 Imagine
that police have reliable statistics that most residents in a college dorm pos-
sess illegal substances of one kind or another. Would the police then have
probable cause to search the entire dorm?115 The conventional answer is no,
because probable cause is thought to require not just a likelihood of finding
evidence but also “individualized” or “particularized” suspicion.116 But what
could this added requirement mean? All inferences in specific cases are
based on generalizations derived from other experiences.117 So at least some
probabilistic evidence seems critical to every reasonable belief. And, in the
dorm hypothetical, it is entirely probable that each individual search would
uncover contraband. Further, the dorm-wide search might seem desirable,
at least for a proponent of interest aggregation: if a single search is socially
beneficial when it is likely to bear fruit, then police could plausibly maximize
social welfare by conducting as many of those searches as possible. So, why
would eminently “probable” cause to suspect guilt generate an unreasonable
search?
The key is to remember that the principle of responsibility safeguards
the innocent by assigning burdens based on whether individuals have had an
opportunity to choose appropriately. And that goal is not served by author-
izing searches and seizures on grounds that afford the innocent no opportu-
nity to choose. That insight calls for differentiating among types of
admittedly probative evidence, since even inferences based on accurate sta-
tistics may not give individuals an opportunity to avoid investigative bur-
dens by choosing appropriately. In general, individual choice has no role,
and the principle of responsibility accordingly does not apply, when an indi-
vidual’s responsibility is inferred entirely based on population-based evi-
dence—that is, evidence that would be unaffected by whether any given
113. See Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveil-
lance and the Fourth Amendment 40 (2007); Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares,
Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 842 (2011) (“When courts
find (or do not find) ‘individualized suspicion,’ they are in fact merely using a substitute term
for the idea of probable cause, a term that itself was never properly defined.”); see also Kiel
Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines,
70 Vand. L. Rev. 1249, 1278 (2017) (surveying the field).
114. See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 461, 462 (2015) (adapting Orin Kerr’s
hypothetical).
115. Jane Bambauer insightfully suggests that the Fourth Amendment “minimize” what
she terms “hassle,” or “the chance that an innocent person will experience a search or seizure.”
Bambauer, supra note 114, at 461. But it is often fair to distribute search-and-seizure burdens
widely, thereby increasing “hassle,” or the odds that innocent people are burdened. As we will
see, for example, police might undertake special-needs searches that equally affect large
groups. See infra Section II.B. Or police might increase the overall odds of experiencing an
unsuccessful search by ratcheting up enforcement in response to a crime wave. See infra Sec-
tion II.B. Contractualism thus illuminates when to minimize hassle—and when not to.
116. E.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (“Where the standard is probable
cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person.”). Because Ybarra states that there was no reason to suspect the defen-
dant, id. at 90, it does not clearly answer Bambauer’s hypothetical.
117. See Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes (2003).
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individual made a morally relevant choice.118 By contrast, individuals are
afforded an opportunity to choose appropriately insofar as they are bur-
dened based on individualized suspicion. In other contexts, this basic idea
has been discussed as “counterfactual sensitivity to the truth.”119
To flesh out how individualized suspicion respects individual choice,
contrast two scenarios in which police prepare to search a dorm room based
on an inference of guilt:
Dorm Search 1 : Police are correct 80% of the time when detecting illegal
narcotics based on odors emanating from dorm rooms. Smelling narcotics
near a particular dorm room, police conclude that the occupant is guilty.
In this scenario, it is quite likely—but not guaranteed—that the occupant of
the dorm room possesses contraband and so is guilty of a crime. So there is
a strong argument that the police have probable cause. For present purposes,
however, the key point is that the likelihood that police would observe the
evidence depends in large part on whether the room’s occupant has chosen
to engage in a crime. If the occupant did not possess illegal narcotics, then the
police probably would not smell the narcotics.120 Thus, the police’s grounds for
suspicion are sensitive to whether the occupant is responsible for a crime.
Now consider a second dorm search scenario that harks back to
Bambauer’s original example. Here, unlike in Dorm Search 1, police rely on
population-based evidence of wrongdoing:
Dorm Search 2 : Research reveals an 80% likelihood that the occupant of
any given dorm room possesses illegal narcotics. Knowing this, police ap-
proach one of the dorm rooms and conclude that the occupant is guilty.
118. This claim is concerned with the burdens that can be justified by the principle of
responsibility and so is not a blanket objection to statistical evidence. Cf. Alex Stein, Foun-
dations of Evidence Law 90–100 (2005) (defending a “principle of maximal individualiza-
tion”); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions,
46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 116, 149 (1978) (considering that “use of statistics” might generally deny
“litigants their rights to be treated as individuals”). For example, population-based evidence
may be relevant to protection or exoneration.
119. See David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and Instrumental
Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 557, 557, 573–75 (2015) (cleaned up)
(describing sensitivity as “the requirement that a belief be counterfactually sensitive to the
truth”). Take the famous “Blue Bus” hypothetical: if a bus is known to have caused a tort, and
70% of local buses are owned by “Blue Bus Company,” is it appropriate to find liability for
that company under a preponderance standard? The challenge is to reconcile the intuitive
answer—“No”—with the intuition that an eye witness reporting a blue bus with the same
70% confidence could support liability. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1331 (1971); see also Enoch & Fisher,
supra at 559–60. The main text suggests a solution: Only the eyewitness report exhibits sensi-
tivity: if the tortious bus were actually red, then the eyewitness would probably have reported a
red bus. By contrast, whether the tortious bus was blue or red would not affect the population-
based statistics.
120. See Enoch & Fisher, supra note 119, at 582–83.
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Here too, the dorm occupant’s guilt is quite likely, and it is therefore plausi-
ble to conclude that probable cause is present. But unlike in the first scena-
rio, the police in Dorm Search 2 are relying on information and inferences
that in no way depend on whether any individual occupant of the dorm has
chosen to commit a crime. If the dorm room’s occupant did not possess illegal
narcotics, then the overall dorm statistics would remain unchanged (or virtually
unchanged).121 Thus, the evidentiary factors that give rise to the police’s sus-
picion are insensitive to whether the occupant has chosen appropriately.122
To be clear, the dorm occupants in both scenarios face the same burdens
and are equally likely to be guilty of wrongdoing. Yet the principles that
would authorize these searches will have very different implications for in-
nocent residents. A principle that allows use of individualized evidence, as in
Dorm Search 1, would honor the value of choice by giving each dorm occu-
pant an ex ante opportunity to choose lawfulness, in which case the odds
that police would (erroneously) detect narcotics in any given room would be
20%. Under that principle, an innocent occupant would face a relatively lim-
ited risk of being subjected to fruitless searches. By contrast, a principle that
allows use of population-based statistics, as in Dorm Search 2, would not
afford the occupant an opportunity to reduce her risk of being searched.
Even if the occupant chose not to possess narcotics, police (or a judge)
would be certain to face the same statistics and find probable cause.
These examples illustrate that anyone who chooses lawfulness has a
strong interest in demanding that police act only based on “wrong-depen-
dent” evidence—that is, evidence that is counterfactually sensitive to an in-
dividual’s wrongdoing, rather than a population’s.123 That is why searches
predicated on population-based statistics can be unfair to the innocent. This
conclusion does not dispute that a principle authorizing Dorm Search 2 may
be socially beneficial and therefore supported by interest aggregation. In-
stead, the point is that any innocent occupant of the dorm would have a
substantial interest in opposing investigative principles that authorized use
of the population-based statistics. So, barring a countervailing individual
interest,124 innocent individuals can reasonably reject investigative principles
that would impose burdens based on “wrong-independent” evidence, such
121. See id. at 575 (discussing the Blue Bus hypothetical).
122. The nature of the government’s knowledge could give rise to additional objections,
apart from the objection in the main text. For example, the police research could be inade-
quately reliable or transparent. Here, however, I assume that the police have an adequate basis
for their population-based knowledge.
123. Enoch and Fisher do not argue from fairness, but instead claim that sensitivity
should often be legally relevant in view of its implications for personal incentives. See Enoch &
Fisher, supra note 119, at 581–83 (generalizing an account put forward by Chris William
Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1228–89
(2001)). There is a common thread here: insensitive inferences are indifferent to personal
choice, a characteristic that is then separately relevant both to incentives (Enoch and Fisher’s
point) and to fairness (my point).
124. Sections II.B–E explore this possibility by discussing the limited permissibility of
suspicionless investigative principles, including during emergencies.
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as population-based evidence, even when that evidence is probative of guilt.
This conclusion implicates many issues in Fourth Amendment law.
Start with presence in a high crime neighborhood. Courts have contro-
versially held that police have greater reason to suspect an individual of
wrongdoing when the individual is present in a “high crime area.”125 Critics
argue that police and courts are unreliable or discriminatory in identifying
high crime areas.126 But the principle of responsibility usually renders those
concerns moot: when police action is justified by the goal of prosecuting
offenders, police cannot fairly rely on presence in a high crime area, a popu-
lation-based inference that exemplifies wrong independence.
Similar reasoning bears on many forms of “big data” policing,127
whereby population information reveals predictive correlations regarding in-
dividuals.128 Imagine that data analytics based on surveillance cameras
showed that young adult men wearing jackets in a certain neighborhood are
often engaged in crime. Further imagine that an officer claimed, based on
those statistics, that he has “reasonable suspicion” as to any person fitting
that description.129 This search policy involves wrong-independent traits: be-
cause the inference of guilt is population-based, young adult men who wear
jackets in the area would lack an opportunity to avoid searches by choosing
lawfulness.130 Whether or not those individuals choose to commit a crime
will not change the fact that they would be subject to arrest. And that signif-
icant burden could often support a reasonable rejection. Thus, a stop would
not be justified by the principle of responsibility.131
125. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (treating presence in a “high crime
area” as a key factor supporting reasonable suspicion).
126. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 Emory
L.J. 259, 302–03, 302 n.259 (2012) (collecting sources critical of a “high crime area” factor).
127. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Rise of Big Data Policing 126–27 (2017)
(discussing the possibility that the individualized suspicion requirement might prompt courts
to resist certain big data policing techniques); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predic-
tive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 327 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers:
Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 35 (2014); Michael L. Rich, Machine
Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 871
(2016) (analyzing “Automated Suspicion Algorithms” under existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine).
128. See generally Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A
Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (2013).
129. See Ferguson, supra note 126.
130. The imagined principle targets a population defined in part by participation in an
activity that individuals have an interest in regularly performing without exposing themselves
to searches and seizures. Thus, it would be unpersuasive to defend the principle on the ground
that local young adult men could abstain from wearing jackets—much as it would have been
unpersuasive to defend the police action in Dorm Search 2 on the ground that students could
choose not to live in a dorm.
131. Kiel Brennan-Marquez has insightfully distinguished predictive probability and ex-
planatory plausibility, suggesting that the Fourth Amendment should focus on the latter. See
Brennan-Marquez, supra note 113. However, predictive probability alone can sometimes jus-
tify protective action. See infra Section II.B. Further, moral intuitions regarding responsibility
are better explained by wrong dependence than explanatory plausibility. Imagine that police:
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By comparison, no similar problem arises when police use new technol-
ogies to generate highly specific suspect descriptions and so find particular-
ized responsibility.132 For example, a surveillance system might detect that a
young adult man wearing a jacket has left the site of a reported robbery. If a
nearby police officer were informed of those recent events and then saw
someone fitting the description, she might fairly stop the suspect. In this
new hypothetical, the suspect description is the same as in the “big data”
scenario above, yet the information is now being used in a way that is wrong
dependent: if the suspect did not engage in a robbery, then the odds that the
officer would observe a person fitting the suspect’s description would greatly
decline. So a principle that allowed stops only based on individualized suspi-
cion would substantially reduce innocent people’s ex ante odds of suffering
investigative burdens. Once that risk is adequately reduced, individuals with
interests in law enforcement—such as potential robbery victims—could rea-
sonably insist on a principle that would allow the investigative stop.
These points also bear on the unfairness of racial profiling. Imagine that
police observe a robust statistical correlation between being a member of an
identifiable racial group and committing some crime. That population-
based correlation would be wrong independent, since whether a particular
person chooses to be a criminal has no significant bearing on whether her
racial group tends to commit crime.133 Thus, a population-based correlation
could not fairly contribute to the belief that a specific individual is responsi-
ble for crime.134 Yet that conclusion is consistent with at least some use of
(i) use big data algorithms to infer from population trends who is a likely speeder, and (ii) use
radar guns to directly observe speeding. The principle of responsibility would reject the al-
gorithm as wrong independent, whereas the radar gun would be wrong dependent. Brennan-
Marquez attempts to distinguish the examples on a different ground. In his view, the algo-
rithms fail a plausibility test whereas the radar gun passes, so long as police using the gun can
consider “surrounding facts” to evaluate its reliability in any given case. See Brennan-Marquez,
supra note 113, at 1273. But these tools’ predictive accuracy is what makes it plausible to
believe their outputs. Thus, both the algorithm and the radar gun generate plausible inferences
that a suspect is speeding. And people operating both the algorithm and the radar gun will
consider surrounding facts only in the rare event that those facts cast doubt on the predictive
accuracy of the tool being used.
132. Whether a police officer’s belief is accurate may fairly be informed by “hit rate”
statistics—so long as the ultimate issue of responsibility rests on individualized suspicion. Cf.
Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 913, 958 (2009)
(arguing for consideration of hit rates but also arguing against undue emphasis on
“individuation”).
133. See Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 159–60 (1997) (“With race-
based police stops, many adversely affected people of color maintain that they are innocent
victims of a policy that penalizes them for the misconduct of others who also happen to be
colored.”); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The
Costs, Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
2010, at 145, 146.
134. But see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (allowing consid-
eration of “apparent Mexican ancestry”). As noted in the main text, this argument applies only
to searches predicated on responsibility. For a per se argument against invidious racial dis-
crimination, see infra Section III.C.
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race when making particularized suspect identifications.135 When a reliable
witness describes a specific offender, including the offender’s race, the racial
description is wrong dependent: if the suspect did not commit the crime in
question, then the odds that someone of the suspect’s racial group would be
observed committing the crime would indeed decline. Thus, individualized
suspect descriptions that take account of race can sometimes contribute to a
finding of responsibility.136
So while some commentators believe that “individualized” or “particu-
larized” suspicion are vapid notions,137 those doctrinal terms can and should
be assigned a valuable meaning, rooted in the notion of wrong dependence.
Moreover, these basic fairness intuitions will become increasingly important
as new, more sophisticated investigative methods will likely enable police to
meet any probabilistic standard of suspicion with population-based infer-
ences, thereby rendering a nonindividuated “probable cause” standard
toothless.138
B. Protection
Search-and-seizure burdens are usually permissible when they protect
individuals from suffering greater harms. This forward-looking protection
principle fundamentally differs from the backward-looking principle of re-
sponsibility discussed in the last Section.139
As we have seen, contractualism is not blind to consequences but in-
stead demands that interest assessments are undertaken on a person-to-per-
son basis.140 So when there is a choice between some persons suffering a
burden and other persons suffering a greater burden, fairness tends to favor
135. Race-based suspect descriptions are not without controversy. See generally R. Richard
Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48
UCLA L. Rev. 1075, 1083–85 (2001) (noting widespread scholarly tolerance for race-based
suspect descriptions before criticizing them); see also Dov Fox, The Second Generation of Racial
Profiling, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 49, 76 (2010) (arguing for “a transition from racial identifiers to
phenotypic ones”).
136. Of course, fairness would still demand that police exhibit due care and have an ap-
propriate level of confidence when attributing responsibility based on a suspect description.
See supra text accompanying note 108. Thus, a race-based suspect description could not fairly
support a race-based dragnet. Cf. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000)
(discussing such a dragnet). And, in Section III.C, we will see that even wrong-dependent
consideration of race can be morally objectionable, such as when it reflects systematic racial
bias.
137. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
138. Cf. Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification
Standards, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1514 (2010) (arguing that, in a digital environment, police usually
have either probable cause or no evidence, making probabilistic suspicion standards
irrelevant).
139. See Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment,
1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 261, 265 (distinguishing between “law enforcement intrusions” and
“police intrusions to protect life and property or to serve other important community caretak-
ing purposes,” and arguing that the latter calls for “a distinct Fourth Amendment approach”).
140. See supra Section I.C.
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avoidance of the greater burden.141 Critically, this result follows not from
interest aggregation, but rather from considering person-to-person reasona-
ble objections. Imagine that someone on a bus is known to be a contract
killer on the way to a hit, but police do not know just who it is. Could police
fairly stop the bus and search its passengers for weapons? Yes. The criminal’s
would-be victim would face a serious prospect of severe injury (or worse)
and so could reasonably reject a principle that would bar a search of the bus.
By contrast, the bus’s passengers would face a far smaller individual burden
and so would have no reasonable grounds for rejecting a principle that al-
lowed the bus search.142 Thus, the protection principle supports the bus
search, even though most affected people are known to be innocent.
Similar logic applies when police face substantial uncertainty and so
must act on incomplete information. As in the context of responsibility, the
challenges of uncertainty call for a requirement of due care: when applying
the protection principle, police must diligently assess the relative risks faced
by various parties. And once that empirical issue is resolved, fairness further
requires consideration of reasonable rejections, accounting for all informa-
tion available to the relevant parties at the time of each search or seizure. So
when considering grounds for rejection, any personal benefits or burdens
should be discounted by their improbability.143 For example, someone who
faces a miniscule risk of harm under a given search-and-seizure principle has
a weaker basis for rejection than another individual who faces certain and
substantial personal harm under the same principle.
Hence the protection principle: police may generally impose the bur-
dens attending searches and seizures when they have exercised due care in
concluding that their actions will protect an individual from substantially
greater burdens. This principle makes it easy to affirm the “exigency” and
“public safety” doctrines, which allow for searches or seizures when police
reasonably believe that doing so is necessary to respond to an emergency.144
As the Court has put it, “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency
or emergency.”145
141. See Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 232–35 (“[I]n a case in which we
must choose between saving one person and saving two, a principle that did not recognize the
presence of the second person on the latter side as making a moral difference, counting in
favor of saving that group, could reasonably be rejected.”).
142. See id. at 232. An interest aggregator would presumably reach the same result here, at
least if we assume that the cost of the prevented crime outweighed the smaller harms endured
by the searched persons.
143. See Frick, supra note 21, at 205–06 (proposing “stage-wise ex ante contractualism”
that aims to remedy defects in Scanlon’s categorically “ex post” approach); T.M. Scanlon,
Reply to Zofia Stemplowska, 10 J. Moral Phil. 508, 510 (2013) (calling his own original insis-
tence on “ex post” analysis “a mistake” and citing Frick); see also Fried, supra note 86 (criticiz-
ing Scanlon’s original ex post approach).
144. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
145. Id. The Court cast this point as an argument for an exigency exception to the warrant
requirement. See id.
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The protection principle also indicates that “transsubstantive” standards
of suspicion—that is, suspicion standards that are insensitive to the gravity
of the alleged crime—are often inappropriate when police are responding to
emergencies.146 Fourth Amendment doctrine sometimes shows some sensi-
tivity to this point.147 For instance, the Court has reserved whether police
may undertake a stop when they have “reasonable suspicion” as to a com-
pleted minor offense, as opposed to an ongoing or serious crime.148 But be-
cause the Court has not distinguished between responsibility and protection,
it has suggested that lower standards of suspicion may be appropriate for
felonies, even when protection is not at issue.149 The best way to understand
this still-muddled doctrine is that the Court intuitively wants police to apply
a different and sometimes-lower standard of suspicion when they are pro-
tecting against serious personal threats.
On reflection, hypotheticals used to discredit transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment doctrines usually involve a specific threat to an individual and
so implicate the protection principle. Take Justice Jackson’s well-known dis-
sent in Brinegar v. United States:
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment . . . it
seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a
roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would
be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be
unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I
should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in
good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indig-
nity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious
146. See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (2011) (criticizing Fourth Amendment
transsubstantivity); William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 869–70 (2001) (same).
147. A salient exception is Welsh v. Wisconsin, which held that police required a warrant
before entering a home for the reason of preserving evidence related to a “noncriminal, traffic
offense.” 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). At times, Welsh flirted with saying that the privacy intru-
sion outweighed the government’s interest in prosecuting such a minor crime. But the Court’s
holding simply required a warrant, and the presence of a warrant doesn’t change the govern-
ment’s asserted interest. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General Reasona-
bleness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 119, 133–34 (1989)
(making this point while observing that Welsh is “not a model of judicial craftsmanship”).
Welsh’s suggestion that the outcome depended on the “gravity” of the offense, 466 U.S. at 753,
could be viewed as an indirect way to account for whether the protection principle applied.
148. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 n.2 (2014) (“[W]e need not address
under what circumstances a stop is justified by the need to investigate completed criminal
activity.” (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)).
149. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“Particularly in the context of
felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that the crime
be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible.” (emphasis added)).
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crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.150
In this passage, Jackson looks favorably on a roadblock to save a recently
kidnapped child while grimacing at similar roadblocks to catch bootleggers.
From the standpoint of fairness, the first search is primarily defensible based
on protection, and the second on responsibility. Yet Jackson conflates these
possible justifications. At the outset, he speaks in terms of a single variable,
“the gravity of the offense.”151 He then accepts the doctrinal premise that a
single standard governs both of these situations, namely “probable cause.”
Finally, he runs together protection and responsibility in positing that, in
the kidnapping scenario, the roadblock would be “the only way to save a
threatened life and detect a vicious crime.”152 Commentators have followed
suit.153
A contractualist Fourth Amendment can accommodate the most com-
pelling aspect of Jackson’s reasoning while simultaneously recognizing that
the “gravity of the offense” generally matters only when a protective interest
is at stake. The key, again, is to tease responsibility and protection apart. In
Jackson’s kidnaping example, the overwhelming majority of people stopped
at the police checkpoint would have had no opportunity to avoid investiga-
tive burdens by choosing appropriately. Even if each individual driver chose
appropriately, she would still be subject to being stopped and searched at the
checkpoint. Thus, the police could not reasonably impose investigative bur-
dens on those drivers based on a principle of responsibility.154 However, the
interests of the abducted child outweigh the burden of being briefly
searched. Amid Jackson’s reasoning is the critical claim that the roadblock
would be “the only way”—and, he should have further demanded, a reason-
ably effective way—“to save a threatened life.”155 Thus, the people stopped
could not reasonably reject a principle allowing the roadblock, but the
abductee could reasonably insist on it.
This use of the protection principle is attractively self-limiting: police
exercising due care could view the roadblock as a valid application of the
protection principle only by finding it to be both necessary and effective. As
time goes on or the search’s geographic area expands, a once-fair roadblock
would turn into a fishing expedition. And an innocent driver could reasona-
bly reject a principle that authorized searches and seizures that had no real-
istic chance of effectively protecting victims. The point at which a protective
150. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). For dicta
to similar effect, see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
151. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. For example, Akhil Amar drew on Jackson’s passage when arguing that “serious
crimes and serious needs can justify more serious searches and seizures”—a statement that
seems not to require a protective interest. Amar, supra note 112, at 802 (emphasis added).
154. See supra Section II.A.
155. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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search becomes an impermissible dragnet will be partly determined by em-
pirics, but fairness dictates the relevant inquiry: suspicionless searches are
generally fair so long as the probability-discounted benefits to protected in-
dividuals exceed the burdens imposed on innocent individuals.
Similar reasoning provides a plausible basis for cases that permit per-
sonal burdens based on “reasonable suspicion,” which is a level of suspicion
less than probable cause.156 In many contexts, it is hard to discern whether
or why the “reasonable suspicion” test is different than “probable cause.”157
Fairness suggests an answer: a lower standard should apply in certain cases
where the protection principle justifies police action. A protective “reasona-
ble suspicion” standard would thus diverge from responsibility-based
searches and seizures in two key respects. First, protective justifications are
concerned with “suspicion” regarding protective needs, not criminality as
such (though the two may often coincide). Second, a protective action can
be fair even when police lack any reasonable belief that they are searching or
seizing people who are guilty of crime, so long as police believe that their
conduct is a necessary and effective way to avert harm.
Imagine for example that police have learned that a hostage is being
held in one of three apartment rooms. The principle of responsibility cannot
justify entry into the rooms unless police reasonably believe that an individ-
ual occupant is guilty of a crime.158 But the hostage could reasonably reject
principles that would prevent entry—and for reasons analogous to those in
Jackson’s hypothetical. Where due care suggests that protective efforts are
both necessary and effective, and no individual can raise a comparable per-
son-to-person objection, police need not believe that the people being
searched and seized are responsible for crime. The key fairness question,
instead, is whether the police believe that a search or seizure is a necessary
and effective “way to save a threatened life.”159
Take the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, where a police officer observed indi-
viduals repeatedly walking back and forth in front of a store, apparently
“casing a job.”160 Even assuming the officer did not reasonably believe that
the suspects were already guilty of a crime, there would still be a reasonable
basis for stopping the suspects if doing so was a necessary and effective way
to avert the greater harm of their future conduct.161 And a frisk might then
156. E.g., Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
28 (1968).
157. See Kit Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 649, 656 (2009) (“[T]he Court seems to have adopted a ‘we know it when we see it’
attitude, taking the position that probable cause is a more demanding standard than reasona-
ble suspicion in some amorphous, ineffable way.”).
158. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
159. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
160. 392 U.S. at 6.
161. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (noting “the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence”).
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be justified by the officer’s own interests in protection, provided a reasona-
ble belief that the suspects posed a danger.162 The Court engaged in interest
aggregation,163 but person-to-person would yield essentially the same out-
come—without opening the door to broader curtailments of individual
rights.
Similar protection-based logic should also inform the scope of the war-
rant presumption. We have seen that the warrant presumption is a safeguard
that protects innocent suspects from police error.164 But the delay of ob-
taining a warrant sometimes threatens personal interests, such as when entry
into a house might prevent a violent crime. Recognizing those scenarios,
potential crime victims could reasonably reject a principle that prevented
police from taking appropriate protective action. Thus, interpersonal com-
parisons support a principle allowing warrantless searches to protect indi-
viduals.165 Importantly, this conclusion is markedly narrower than current
doctrine, which draws no distinction between “exigencies” involving threats
to individuals as opposed to evidence destruction.166 By contrast, the protec-
tion principle supports warrantless entry only to defend individuals from
harm.
Finally, the protection principle supplies a framework for resolving the
so-called “special-needs” cases, in which the government undertakes
programmatic searches without individualized suspicion and for reasons
other than “the general interest in crime control.”167
On its face, the special-needs doctrine seems like an exception to basic
principles of Fourth Amendment law. Whereas many Fourth Amendment
cases, historical sources, and commentators support a strict requirement of
individualized suspicion,168 the special-needs cases allow for suspicionless
searches and seizures. The Court claims that these measures are critical to
achieving governmental interests, such as reducing teenage drug use.169 But
the government often has interests that are achievable only, or much more
162. Id. at 23–24.
163. Id. at 20–21.
164. See supra text accompanying note 111.
165. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006).
166. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (collecting cases).
167. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39–40 (2000) (distinguishing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 653 (1995).
168. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Rea-
sonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. Mem. L. Rev. 483, 530 (1995) (“The framers be-
lieved individualized suspicion to be an inherent component of the concept of
reasonableness.”); Taslitz, supra note 133.
169. E.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (“Deterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren”
implicates a special need); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989)
(“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety,
like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a government
office, school, or prison, ‘likewise presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforce-
ment . . . .’” (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1987))).
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effectively, by dispensing with individualized suspicion.170 To prevent the
special-needs exception from devouring the individualized-suspicion rule,
the Court finds special needs only when the government’s interest is distinct
from “crime detection”171 and “the general interest in crime control.”172
Yet the doctrine’s aversion to “the general interest in crime control” is
uncomfortably ad hoc. Even in cases that involve general crime control, the
Court frequently asserts that the Fourth Amendment calls for balancing
competing interests.173 And if that is so, then why shouldn’t crime detection
be a basis for programmatic searches and seizures? Reducing crime is, after
all, a very important interest. Moreover, the Court’s special-needs cases have
entertained a wide range of governmental interests, many of which seem
hard to distinguish from general crime control.174 National security cases
underscore the point. In recent years, some courts have suggested that
programmatic searches and seizures can be upheld under the special-needs
doctrine, on the theory that those efforts advance the government’s interests
in objectives arguably related to preventing terrorism. And because terror-
ism can arise in so many forms and contexts, the special-needs doctrine
plausibly supports wide-ranging suspicionless searches and seizures—such
as the National Security Agency’s telephonic metadata program.175
The Court’s failure to distinguish special needs from general crime con-
trol can be viewed as a symptom of a deeper theoretical problem. Once life-
and-death policy objectives are admitted into the Court’s interest aggrega-
tion, those issues will tend to outweigh any other interests, leaving little
room for Fourth Amendment rights.176 Again, the most obvious version of
this problem involves terrorism or national security. But a similar problem
pertains to many other life-and-death interests, such as teenage drug use.177
Once a court accepts that there is a serious risk of student deaths, interest
aggregation would seem to favor any maximally curative response, regardless
of its distributional or individualized implications. Yet the Court has closely
examined the details of programmatic search policies and considered a vari-
ety of factors separate from, and in tension with, a requirement that the
170. E.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 468–70, 469 n.1 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1997) (“When such ‘special
needs’—concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amend-
ment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the com-
peting private and public interests advanced by the parties.”).
172. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (quoting Edmond,
531 U.S. at 44 (2000)). The Court also glosses “special needs” as needs “beyond normal law
enforcement.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–74
(1987)).
173. E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968); see supra text accompanying notes 71–74.
174. See supra note 169 (collecting cases).
175. See Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring in denial of hearing en banc).
176. See supra note 13 (collecting sources).
177. See supra note 169 (collecting cases).
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program maximize aggregate welfare.178 Those additional considerations,
like the bar on general crime control, are what remain of the Fourth
Amendment in special-needs cases. Yet they do not seem to flow from the
Court’s professed cost–benefit analysis.
A better approach would begin by viewing special-needs cases as in-
stances of programmatic protection.179 What makes special-needs searches
“special” is the presence of a protective interest that is systematic in nature
and thus susceptible to programmatic responses. Suspicionless security
checks at airports offer a paradigmatic example180 (and so should not rest on
a supposed “border search exception” to Fourth Amendment principles181).
The protective interest is in preventing terrorists from gaining access to air-
craft. Yet any given security check is unlikely to uncover terrorism. Airport
security could be working well—indeed, perfectly well—if it completely de-
terred would-be malefactors and so never uncovered evidence of terror-
ism.182 Is suspicionless airport screening therefore unfair? No, because many
air travelers could reasonably reject a principle that precluded suspicionless
airport screening, given the increased risk that terrorism would then pose.183
These cross-cutting arguments push us toward a more nuanced approach
than simply saying that suspicionless airport screenings are categorically ei-
ther permissible or impermissible.
In general, special-needs searches are justified under the protection
principle when two conditions are met.
First, police must believe, based on due care, that a program of searches
or seizures is a necessary and effective way to protect against severe personal
178. See supra note 167 (collecting cases).
179. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 Stan. L.
Rev. 1039, 1042 (2016) (drawing a transactional/programmatic distinction).
180. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here the risk to public
safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and
other official buildings.” (citation omitted)).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). The Court’s “right of the
sovereign” rationale is not consistent with fairness. Nor is the Court’s reliance on the asserted
difficulties of policing the border. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–64
(1976). Consent could perhaps play some role in justifying border searches, see infra Section
II.C, but only for persons who have a viable choice not to enter and so can give meaningful
consent in this context.
182. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675–76 n.3 (1989)
(“When the Government’s interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a low incidence
of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the scheme for implementing this interest,
is more logically viewed as a hallmark of success.”).
183. The argument in the main text relies on protection as opposed to intrapersonal ag-
gregation because some people searched at airports may be one-off travelers who would have
little personal interest in future deterrence. Cf. Elizabeth Ashford, The Demandingness of Scan-
lon’s Contractualism, 113 Ethics 273, 289, 298–300 (2003). Those people’s objection to suspi-
cionless searches and seizures would then have to be defeated by the personal objections of, for
example, long-term air travelers.
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harms.184 Suspicionless searches and seizures impose significant personal
burdens; thus, those burdens can be justified on a person-to-person basis
only for the sake of avoiding a relatively severe personal harm. This require-
ment gives content to the doctrinal prohibition on using special-needs
searches to pursue “the general interest in crime control” by making clear
that speculative or diffuse law-enforcement interests cannot justify suspi-
cionless searches—as would be permissible under interest aggregation.185
Note that a special-needs program can be protective through deterrence,
even if it never turns up evidence of crime. This point reflects the difference
between the prospective protection principle and the retrospective principle
of responsibility. And because special-needs searches do not depend on re-
sponsibility,186 they may fairly rest on many group generalizations rooted in
population-based generalizations, such as that high school students face dis-
tinctive safety threats. For the same reason, protective searches and seizure
may rely on nonindividualized inferences of guilt, including inferences based
on “big data” models.187
Second, implementation of the program must also comport with fair-
ness. This additional requirement reflects that special-needs searches are not
one-off responses to discrete emergencies, but rather deliberately crafted
programs that operate over time.188 The full demands of fairness will natu-
rally be context dependent, but some generally applicable points can be
made. Most fundamentally, fair implementation requires that the program’s
benefits and burdens are distributed fairly. The government’s protective in-
terest must be pursued fully, and not selectively. For instance, a principle in
favor of employing more time-consuming airport screening methods at po-
litically powerless locations, while expending greater resources to facilitate
screening at locales of greater political influence, would be subject to reason-
able rejection and therefore unfair.189 Fairness thus complements other
checks on systematically skewed law enforcement,190 including political
184. Some special-needs cases fail this requirement and so are best defended, if at all,
based on the principle of helpfulness. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004) (discuss-
ing stops “when police simply ask for . . . help”); infra Section II.E.
185. Though the Court’s dicta sometimes condones special-needs searches without ad-
ducing any evidentiary basis whatsoever, see supra note 180, the Court’s holdings tend to
demand evidence, see, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321–22.
186. See supra text accompanying note 133.
187. Still, fairness imposes limits. See infra Section III.C.
188. See Renan, supra note 179; supra note 13 (collecting sources).
189. Political process theories can arrive at a similar conclusion. See Richard C. Worf, The
Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 Touro L. Rev.
93 (2007); see also Slobogin, supra note 104, at 126–43.
190. Cf. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 Va. L. Rev. 31 (2017) (arguing for certain con-
straints on “crackdowns,” which may involve searches and seizures, and rooting that claim
partly in the Take Care Clause).
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checks on police activities.191 Once fairly distributed, search-and-seizure bur-
dens can trigger scrutiny and public debate, thereby facilitating judicial eval-
uation of empirical issues while introducing the possibility that even an
admittedly fair program would be defeated politically.
To illustrate these points, consider the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Mills v.
District of Columbia, where police had established neighborhood check-
points to stop a spree of local drive-by shootings.192 The court concluded
that the checkpoints served only the “general interest in crime control” and
so were not a legitimate special-needs program.193 That analysis wrongly de-
nied the reasonableness of law-enforcement efforts to protect people from
violent crime. Instead, the court should have asked how much the check-
points reduced the risk of drive-by shootings and whether the relevant bur-
dens were equally distributed across neighborhoods facing similar dangers.
If the checkpoints were adequately protective and equally distributed, then
individuals burdened by the checkpoints could not reasonably reject a prin-
ciple allowing them, given the arguments that could be raised by people who
sought to reduce their risk of being harmed by drive-by shootings.
C. Consent
Searches and seizures are sometimes justified by consent. Scanlon argues
that a general principle in favor of consent can be justified by the “value of
choice,” or the benefits that come when individuals have control over their
own persons and property.194 In the Fourth Amendment context, for exam-
ple, individuals might agree to searches and seizures to dispel suspicion or to
aid the police in an urgent investigation. The resulting police actions would
still impose burdens on the consenting party and require justification. But
given the benefits of leaving these kinds of personal choices to individuals, a
principle that prevented people from choosing to agree to search-and-
seizure burdens could be subject to reasonable rejection.
In practice, however, consent is more complicated. As in the context of
responsibility, individuals can reasonably reject investigative principles that
lack adequate safeguards.195 So, for example, a principle that allowed the
191. This point links fairness with the extensive and growing literature on linking demo-
cratic approval with the constitutionality of governmental surveillance. See Barry Friedman &
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1827 (2015); Dan M. Kahan &
Tracey L. Meares, Foreword, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153, 1174
(1998); see also supra note 190.
192. 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding a likelihood of success on the merits in
reviewing a request for preliminary injunction).
193. See Mills, 571 F.3d at 1308–12.
194. See Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 294; supra Section I.C; see also
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (“In a society based on law, the concept of
agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own.”).
195. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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police to threaten illegal action to obtain consent could reasonably be re-
jected, since those threats would undermine the value of choice.196 And indi-
viduals could also reasonably reject investigative principles that allowed
police to find consent without exercising due care. A more auspicious prin-
ciple would authorize investigative burdens where police have determined,
based on due care, that an individual has chosen to submit to a search or
seizure, rather than simply allowing the police to take other lawful investiga-
tive actions. That presumptive justification for searching or seizing is the
consent principle.
A contractualist approach can thus acknowledge that a consent-based
search is still a search, and a burdensome one at that.197 And contractualism
also suggests a straightforward explanation for why a search or seizure can
be predicated on apparent authority.198 Again, a reasonable principle of con-
sent searches would insist on due care, since a less demanding principle
would be subject to reasonable objection. And due care would be present
when police have good reason to think that consent has been granted by the
proper party, even if they turn out to be wrong.199 Thus, the Court is right
to: (i) view consent-based searches as “searches,” (ii) link consent to the
reasonableness of police action, and (iii) allow for consent-based searches
where the consent came from someone with only apparent authority, pro-
vided that the police exercise due care in arriving at their (incorrect) finding
of consent.
But while courts are right on the abstract fundamentals, attention to
fairness also draws attention to ways that existing doctrine comes up short.
For example, police often misrepresent their encounters with suspects or
take advantage of people’s unawareness of their legal right to decline con-
sent.200 And there is reason to think that the mere presence of inquisitive
police can make interviewees feel pressured, even in the absence of an overt
196. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (“[T]he Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by
implied threat or covert force.”).
197. Justice Thurgood Marshall and others have proposed that consent-based searches are
not Fourth Amendment searches at all because consent eliminates an individual’s “expectation
of privacy.” See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189–90 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “third-party consent searches” rest “not on the premise that they are ‘reasonable’
under the Fourth Amendment, but on the premise that a person may voluntarily limit his
expectation of privacy by allowing others to exercise authority over his possessions” (citation
omitted)). But that view would give the constitutional term “searches” an artificially con-
stricted meaning. When someone invites an officer to conduct a search, a “search” is most
certainly what results.
198. See id. at 187–89; see also Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1171, 1172 (2007).
199. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86 (“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determina-
tions that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not that they always be
correct, but that they always be reasonable.”).
200. See generally Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he subject’s knowledge of a right to
refuse . . . is not . . . a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.”); id. at 277 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (“I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends upon
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threat.201 As a result, consent may be impossible in many contexts involving
police-suspect interactions. At a minimum, the risk of coercion should in-
form the standard of due care that fairness demands: because an individual
could reasonably reject an investigative principle that allowed police to pres-
sure suspects into acquiescence, fairness calls for greater safeguards that ad-
dress interviewees’ vulnerability to coercion and thereby protect the value of
choice during interactions with police.
D. Curiosity
Fourth Amendment doctrine is confused when it comes to police activi-
ties that seem like “searches” and “seizures” but that may lawfully be per-
formed without any suspicion at all. Contractualism suggests a more
persuasive framework for addressing these scenarios by directing attention
toward settled social practices that reflect competing social interests in both
privacy and curiosity. On this view, settled social practices operate not as a
prerequisite for Fourth Amendment protection but rather as one type of
justification for imposing search-and-seizure burdens. This approach should
replace the doctrinal “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis.202
Settled practices are often key to understanding what actions are fair,
particularly when various principles of conduct could be adopted without
being reasonably rejected by anyone. In these situations, there is moral room
for society to adopt any one of a range of practices. Yet it may be important
to have a settled practice in place for the sake of coordination and effi-
ciency.203 So, once a settled practice is established, deviations may require
some special justification.204 Scanlon calls this idea “the Principle of Estab-
lished Practices.”205
We can see this principle in many aspects of social life. For instance,
there may be no grounds for objecting to a principle of driving on either the
right- or left-hand side of the road.206 If adopted, either rule would be im-
mune to reasonable rejection, since either option would benefit every indi-
vidual far more than it would harm any individual (if it harmed anyone at
knowledge that there is a choice to be made.”); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury
and What to Do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037 (1996).
201. David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure
Standard, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 51 (2009); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus
Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 153.
202. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See gen-
erally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (2007)
(identifying four distinct models underlying the Court’s “reasonable expectations of privacy”
analysis).
203. See generally David K. Lewis, Convention (1969); Andrei Marmor, Social Con-
ventions: From Language to Law (2009).
204. See Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 339 (“[I]f one of these (nonreject-
able) principles [of conduct] is generally (it need not be unanimously) accepted in a given
community, then it is wrong to violate it simply because this suits one’s convenience.”).
205. Id.
206. Cf. Lewis, supra note 203, at 6.
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all). But once there is a settled practice of driving on the right-hand side,
drivers would require some special reason to drive on the left-hand side.
Reasons for deviating from principles of privacy are likewise sensitive to set-
tled practices.207 Different societies exhibit varied privacy norms; and many
of those norms, if adopted, would be immune to reasonable rejection and
therefore fair.208 But given the practical need to choose one privacy regime,
adherence to a settled practice is a presumptive requirement of fairness.
Building on Scanlon’s brief account, we might say that privacy norms
can be permissive as well as prohibitory and that permissive privacy norms
are often rooted in what might broadly be called “the value of curiosity.” In
many situations, learning information about someone imposes burdens on
that individual but is nonetheless justified. To get along in everyday life,
people need to know about one another, and we frequently obtain that criti-
cal information nonconsensually. We ask around about the new kid on the
block, Google basic information about prospective coworkers, and visit
archives to research the biographies of public figures. These situations all
involve the genus curiosity, though the species—personal, professional, or
political—varies with the circumstances. So long as the principle of curiosity
leaves a sufficient zone of personal privacy, no individual can reasonably
demand that privacy take a specific shape. But when exactly should curiosity
bow to privacy and other interests? This question does not allow for a single,
universal answer because there are many reasonable ways of balancing the
competing interests in curiosity and privacy. Again, however, some reasona-
ble, generally recognized balance should exist so that people can coordinate
their behavior accordingly.
So we are not adrift. Given settled social practices, some forms of curi-
osity are recognizably unobjectionable while others are highly objectionable,
with zones of indeterminacy in between. To continue the foregoing exam-
ples, asking about people, Googling them, and conducting archival research
are all generally viewed as permissible courses of action—not because there
is no privacy interest at stake, but rather because those actions conform with
settled social practices that are generally justified by the value of curiosity.
And because they generally authorize the curiosity not just of police officers
but also of private persons, these settled social practices shed light on the
accepted limits of privacy. To be clear, these practices play a strictly limited
role, in that they resolve otherwise underdetermined fairness issues.209 So
any settled practice can itself be unreasonable, if the principle that would
permit it could reasonably be rejected. For example, we will see that invidi-
ous search-and-seizure criteria are categorically unreasonable.210 A settled
practice of invidious searches and seizures would thus be unreasonable, even
if viewed as a settled practice.
207. See Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 339.
208. Privacy practices can be justified by dignitary and other personal interests. See id. at
340.
209. See id. at 339.
210. See infra Section III.C.
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This focus on settled practices is preferable to the “reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy” analysis that, under current doctrine, often operates as a
prerequisite for Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.211 For example,
when following a suspect on open roads, doctrine maintains that police have
undertaken no “search” at all, on the theory that they have not impinged on
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”212 But under any normal use of lan-
guage, the police are engaged in “searches” whenever they seek informa-
tion.213 And people who are trailed even briefly on open roads do suffer an
infringement of real and often significant privacy interests.214 A better ap-
proach would begin by conceding what is linguistically obvious: trailing
someone on open roads is a “search” within that word’s normal meaning.
The harder question is whether such a search is “unreasonable,” which de-
pends on whether it accords with principles that can reasonably be rejected.
On the one hand, a potential target of police surveillance might seek to re-
ject a principle allowing for open-road surveillance because it would intrude
on her privacy interests. On the other hand, a potential beneficiary of this
surveillance might point to its crime-stopping potential. Given this clash of
facially reasonable arguments, we should investigate whether the search in
question accords with settled social practices.
The goal here would be to identify an actual social practice relating to
privacy or its absence.215 It would not suffice to show with polls that most
people would prefer one practice over another.216 After all, people might
want established practices to change. Moreover, laws applicable to private
parties will often be relevant to identifying settled practices, but they cannot
control whether those practices either exist or are reasonable.217 For exam-
ple, the conduct that currently qualifies as illegal “stalking” was contrary to
211. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kerr,
supra note 202. Amusingly, recent decisions pretend that the Katz Court adopted this standard,
instead of Justice Harlan. E.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013) (asking about “the
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ described in Katz”—and never so much as mentioning
Harlan’s name).
212. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 285 (1983) (“A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his move-
ments from one place to another.”).
213. See, e.g., Search, n., Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
174307 [https://perma.cc/HG9N-LPMG] (collecting broad uses of “search” dating back centu-
ries); see also Amar, supra note 112, at 768 (“[T]he Court has played word games, insisting that
sunglass or naked-eye searches are not really searches.”).
214. Critics often emphasize long-term GPS surveillance’s ability to observe trips to visit
treatment centers or lovers, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
but short-term observation can do the same.
215. Cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (reserving whether a search rule
should apply only where “the technology in question is not in general public use”).
216. For leading poll-based approaches, see Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 205 (2015); Slobogin, supra note 113, at 108–16.
217. Positive law reflects myriad policy and political considerations and so does not relia-
bly reflect Fourth Amendment fairness. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120–21 (2006);
Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 Harv. L. Rev. F. 313, 318 (2016); see also Sherry F.
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settled social practices even before there were anti-stalking laws.218 And if the
law one day granted an unlimited easement for strangers to enter into one
another’s homes,219 that legal change would not in itself mean that entering
private homes had become a settled practice, much less a reasonable one.
Again, settled practices influence the contractualist analysis only when they
cannot be reasonably rejected. That requirement allows contractualist rea-
soning about settled social practices to avoid the circularity problem that
bedevils “reasonable expectations of privacy” analysis.220
Settled practices provide an attractive basis for many foundational ap-
plications of the “reasonable expectations of privacy” standard. For instance,
it seems safe to posit that settled social practices are consistent with any-
body—even police—pursuing their curiosity by asking around about unfa-
miliar people or observing the goings on at a city intersection. Moreover,
there is no apparent reason why a search-and-seizure principle allowing for
those modes of investigation could be reasonably rejected. Quite the con-
trary, striking the balance between privacy and curiosity by allowing for
those practices seems unlikely to impose significant net burdens on anyone.
Thus, those investigative acts are generally permissible—as current doctrine
maintains. Similar reasoning might support case law that attends to profes-
sional practices when securing individual privacy in public workplaces.221
By contrast, no settled social practices involve one person indulging his
curiosity by engaging in long-term observations of another specific individ-
ual. Quite the contrary, most forms of long-term, covert observation are
rare and socially unacceptable, even if the observations pertain to someone’s
movement in public, and that conclusion finds added support in (but does
not depend on) criminal stalking prohibitions. Attention to settled practices
thus accords with the relatively forward-looking application of the Katz test
elaborated in separate opinions in United States v. Jones.222 Under those
Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints
of a Remedy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 119, 123 (2002) (focusing on “the transgression of a legal or
social norm”). But see William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1821, 1877 (2016) (“Under the positive law model,” Fourth
Amendment issues should be resolved “by looking to underlying rules of property and agency
law”).
218. By contrast, a strict “positive law model” would not view stalking behavior as cause
for Fourth Amendment concern until and unless it is rendered unlawful for private parties. See
Baude & Stern, supra note 217.
219. See Re, supra note 217, at 330–31 (raising this hypothetical).
220. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1524
n.63 (2010) (collecting sources). But see Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The
Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1747 (2017). Kugler and
Strahilevitz show that public expectations regarding privacy are sticky, despite legal changes;
but they do not disprove a “weak” version of the circularity problem. Id.
221. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (“Public employees’ expectations
of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the
private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures . . . .”).
222. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id.
at 427–29 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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opinions, police would have to adduce some justification besides mere curi-
osity to use a GPS tracker to monitor a suspect on open roads for several
weeks. Note, however, that the Jones opinions treated this issue as a question
about whether a “search” had occurred. By contrast, the argument from
settled practices adduced here would give “search” its normal meaning and
focus instead on whether police have reasonably justified their conduct.
Attention to settled practices also provides attractive results where the
“expectation of privacy” doctrine currently stumbles. Imagine for example
that police convince an informant to wear a wire when having incriminating
conversations with a suspect. This scenario goes well beyond common gos-
sip and finds no support in settled social practices. Secret listening devices
exist but are rarely used, generally frowned upon, and often even illegal.223
The upshot is that the value of curiosity cannot support the police actions in
the imagined scenario. So, for the use of a listening device to be fair, there
must be some other justification, such as an argument that the intruded-on
parties are reasonably believed to be responsible for crimes. Alas, the Court
reached the opposite conclusion: based on the “third-party doctrine,” the
Court believes that individuals lose their “reasonable expectation of privacy”
in information “voluntarily conveyed” to a third party.224 Fairness, by con-
trast, calls for attention to social practices—and so can tell the difference
between gossip and professional spying.
E. Helpfulness
The law of searches and seizures encompasses subpoenas and other or-
ders to disclose evidence of crime, including crime by third parties. Those
commonplace orders implicate a final basis for searches and seizures: the
principle of helpfulness.
Morality sometimes requires that people assist one another. We have
already seen a version of this point in connection with the protection princi-
ple and emergency situations.225 But moral duties of assistance extend be-
yond emergencies. As Scanlon notes, if he had “a piece of information that
would be of great help to” someone, then it “would surely be wrong of me
to fail (simply out of indifference) to give her this information when there is
no compelling reason not to do so.”226 Scanlon calls this intuitive idea “the
Principle of Helpfulness.”227 Note that the principle of helpfulness requires a
large asymmetry in competing interests: the help must be highly valuable to
the beneficiary and only negligibly harmful to the benefactor. By contrast, a
223. E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 632 (West 2017).
224. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 750–52 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also infra text accompanying notes 237–239 (dis-
cussing cell site locational data).
225. See supra text accompanying note 150.
226. Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 224.
227. Id.
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principle that would require greater assistance might be susceptible to rea-
sonable rejection by the would-be benefactor, who would have reason to
place limits on the claims of others. Thus, the principle of helpfulness is
weak, in that it creates only limited obligations.
Duties of helpfulness also exist in the law enforcement context. Let us
assume that enforcement of the criminal law is to be regarded as morally
justified.228 Members of the public would then have reason to reject any
principle that would allow purely obstructionist withholding of information
that would assist the government in investigating a crime. So when the gov-
ernment requests information that might be pertinent to an investigation
and can easily be disclosed, the recipient will often have a duty, rooted in
fairness, to provide that information.
These conclusions substantially accord with existing doctrine.229 When
called upon, individuals usually have a legal obligation to disclose useful
evidence to the government, provided both that the information is relevant
to a legitimate investigative goal and that compliance is not “unreasonably
burdensome.”230 Moreover, courts and scholars often defend this practice
partly on the ground that disclosure of relevant evidence generally does not
impose a severe burden—or, at least, that it imposes much less of a burden
than a police search or seizure.231 So, at a relatively high level of abstraction,
subpoena law resonates with the principle of helpfulness.
Still, the limitations built into the principle of helpfulness draw atten-
tion to two potential grounds for defeating the general duty of helpfulness.
Alas, current case law is inadequately attentive to the first of these
grounds—and almost oblivious to the second. The principle of helpfulness
thus suggests areas for reform.
First, the burden of complying with a demand for information could be
so large as to make any principle authorizing such requests subject to rea-
sonable rejection.232 Fourth Amendment law on this topic has become
toothless, and the most salient recent litigation in this vein has consequently
focused on statutory grounds, rather than the Fourth Amendment. A recent
example is the “Apple v. FBI litigation,” in which the government obtained a
228. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 100 (discussing this assumption, its possible
justifications, and some of its implications).
229. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“[T]he public . . . has
a right to every man’s evidence,” with certain exceptions for privilege. (omission in original)
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972))); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306
(1967) (abandoning the mere evidence rule).
230. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) (“It is now settled that, when an
administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires
that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive
so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.”).
231. See Louis Michael Seidman, Response, The Problems with Privacy’s Problem, 93
Mich. L. Rev. 1079, 1092 (1995) (arguing that subpoenas are “self-searches” that “involve no
violence, no disruption, no public humiliation or embarrassment”). More plausibly, a “self-
search” usually involves much less disruption, humiliation, and embarrassment.
232. See See, 387 U.S. at 544–45.
June 2018] Fourth Amendment Fairness 1453
court order directing that Apple design a means of defeating its own prod-
uct’s encryption.233 Apple contended that, if it created a program capable of
penetrating the encryption on one of its devices, that same program would
lie around like a loaded gun, endangering the security of myriad Apple
products owned and relied on by other individuals.234 That argument, if em-
pirically sound, might yield a reasonable basis for consumers to reject the
government’s investigative principle.235 The case mooted out before setting
any precedent, but all parties overwhelmingly argued based on a “reasona-
bleness” requirement in the All Writs Act, rather than the Fourth Amend-
ment.236 A fairness-based approach would locate that debate in the
Constitution, rather than in statutory law entirely within the control of
Congress.
Second—and even more importantly—a principle requiring informa-
tion disclosure could be subject to reasonable rejection insofar as it imposed
burdens on persons with an interest in the information’s confidentiality.
Take orders for disclosure of historical cell-site location information, which
(at the time of this writing) the Court is now reviewing in Carpenter v.
United States.237 Because locational information is often highly revealing,
particularly when disclosed in large quantities, cell phone users have a strong
interest in rejecting principles that would allow the government an unlim-
ited ability to demand the information. Thus, the relatively weak principle of
helpfulness could not justify these disclosure orders. A stronger principle
would have to be brought to bear. For example, the principle of responsibil-
ity might apply if police had a reasonable belief that the burdened party is
responsible for a crime.238
Current doctrine often ignores this second limitation based on the
third-party doctrine, which holds that individuals lack a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in confidential information that is “voluntarily conveyed” to
a third party, including when the third party is a colleague, a bank, or a
233. See Arash Khamooshi, Breaking Down Apple’s iPhone Fight with the U.S. Government,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/03/technology/ap-
ple-iphone-fbi-fight-explained.html?r=0 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (primary
documents).
234. See id.
235. I assume, consistent with Scanlon’s writings, that only natural persons can raise rea-
sonable rejections. Thus, Apple itself cannot raise a reasonable objection based on its own
interests in avoiding compliance. However, Apple and other corporations may be able to raise
the Fourth Amendment rights of its customers. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16
(1976) (discussing third-party standing).
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012); Khamooshi, supra note 233.
237. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017).
238. Statutory law allows for disclosure based on a broader standard: “reasonable grounds
to believe” that the data is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012); see also infra text accompanying note 269 (discussing collateral bur-
dens associated with wiretaps and the like).
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telecom.239 The government thus has legal authority to compel the disclosure
of the confidential information. The third-party doctrine is often viewed as
highly objectionable,240 and the various principles of fairness put forward in
this Part help to explain why. As we have seen, a search or seizure that dis-
closes information about an individual is a burden requiring justification.
But in third-party cases, there is generally no consent to disclose confidential
information.241 Moreover, there is no settled social practice of coercing the
disclosure of confidences—and even if there were, it would itself be subject
to reasonable rejection. Finally, we have just seen that the principle of help-
fulness cannot justify searches or seizures that impose significant burdens.
So the coerced disclosures authorized by the third-party doctrine are unfair,
barring the application of a stronger justificatory principle, such as the prin-
ciple of responsibility or the protection principle.242
* * *
The above principles supply a nonexhaustive, overlapping set of reasons
for conducting searches and seizures. But those reasons are only part of the
story, since they are both limited in scope and sometimes defeated by other
moral considerations. The next Part accordingly turns away from the sources
of Fourth Amendment fairness and focuses instead on sources of unfairness.
III. Sources of Unfairness
The last Part identified situations where searches and seizures are often
fair. It is now time to address situations where, notwithstanding the general
principles of fairness discussed above, searches and seizures are nonetheless
unfair.
A. Excessive Burdens
The principles outlined in Part II all have built-in limitations that must
be observed. Where those justificatory limitations are exceeded, searches and
seizures impose excessive burdens—and are unfair. For example, we have
239. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it
will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.”); Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889.
240. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 113, at 152–54; Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-
Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 563 (2009) (collecting sources). But see Kerr, supra
(defending the third-party doctrine).
241. See supra note 239 (quoting Miller). Terms of service that afford confidentiality often
acknowledge the need to comply with disclosures ordered by law. See, e.g., In re Application of
the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying the third-
party doctrine in part because “subscribers’ contractual terms of service and providers’ privacy
policies . . . make clear that providers will turn over these records to government officials if
served with a court order”). But the fairness of those orders is the very point at issue—and so
requires separate justification.
242. See supra text accompanying note 238.
June 2018] Fourth Amendment Fairness 1455
seen that the consent principle is bounded by the terms of consent and so
cannot justify additional burdens.
Similar justificatory limits are visible in cases involving the “plain view”
doctrine. Take Arizona v. Hicks,243 where police entered an apartment for
reasons of exigency, noticed some stereo equipment, and moved the equip-
ment to observe its serial number.244 One question was whether the police
required a justification specifically to manipulate the stereo equipment and
observe the serial number.245 The Court held that the police had “exposed to
view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents” and so “did pro-
duce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy,” which accordingly required
justification.246 On that narrow point, the Court was correct. Moving the
equipment occasioned a “new invasion of respondent’s privacy,” yielding a
distinctive personal burden beyond what was reasonably necessary to inves-
tigate the exigency.247 So, to be fair, that search required some justification.
The limitations on the principle of responsibility have more complex
implications. As we have seen, many searches and seizures draw moral force
from the government’s punitive goals: if the criminal laws are properly justi-
fied, then it is generally fair for the government to make reasonable efforts
to identify, detain, and prosecute people who are reasonably believed to be
responsible for crime.248 But that logic has a built-in limitation: it does not
authorize police to impose burdens that exceed what is reasonably necessary
to effectuate criminal punishment. When police rely on the principle of re-
sponsibility, prospective suspects can reasonably object to principles that
would allow gratuitous search-and-seizure burdens, or that would create
burdens in excess of the maximum lawful penalty for the suspected crime.
For example, someone responsible for jaywalking could fairly be stopped
and fined, but not held overnight or subjected to a body-cavity search.
For a more interesting example, consider Winston v. Lee, where the po-
lice sought to surgically remove a bullet reasonably believed to be lodged
inside a suspect.249 That scenario implicated the principle of responsibility,
since the police had reason to believe that the suspect had committed a
crime. Yet a principle that would allow for investigative surgeries could rea-
sonably be rejected, due to the bodily intrusion and health risks involved.250
243. 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (applying “plain view” doctrine).
244. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
245. See id. at 324.
246. Id. at 325.
247. Id.
248. On the justifiability of criminal laws, see supra note 100 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing contractualist thought on this subject).
249. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
250. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 761, 766 (discussing “bodily integrity” and “medical risks”
as factors).
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The Court purported to reach this conclusion through interest aggrega-
tion,251 but a fairness analysis is more apt. The wrongness of demanding the
invasive and dangerous surgery did not depend on whether the surgery
would be net beneficial to society, as an interest aggregator might argue.
Rather, the procedure’s wrongness flowed from the severe harms imposed
on an individual where no other individual had a comparably strong basis
for demanding the procedure. But investigative surgeries are not categori-
cally unfair. If the item to be extracted were a bomb, for instance, a protec-
tive justification might render the extraction fair, despite the suspect’s
personal interests.
Current doctrine sometimes reflects the limitations of multiple search-
and-seizure principles. The “excessive force” doctrine supplies a good exam-
ple.252 Under this line of cases, police have a Fourth Amendment duty to
limit the physical harmfulness of their actions, even when they have ample
justification to seize someone.253 Consider Tennessee v. Garner, where police
used lethal force to prevent a suspected burglar’s escape.254 The common law
had granted a broad privilege for force against an escaping felon; but, as the
Court noted, felonies were historically linked to capital punishment.255 The
Court accordingly found that that rule would be “distorted” if applied to
relatively venial felonies that were punishable only by terms of imprison-
ment.256 That reasoning reflected the limitations of the principle of responsi-
bility: killing a suspect is a patently excessive means of prosecuting crimes
that are not even punishable by death.
But uses of force also implicate the protection principle, and courts have
considered its limitations in tandem with limits on the principle of responsi-
bility. In Graham v. Connor, the Court endorsed “a careful balancing of ‘the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”257 Be-
cause it references apparently diffuse “governmental interests,” Graham
seems open to interest aggregation;258 however, the most persuasive aspects
of Graham accord with contractualist principles of fairness.259 As we have
251. See id. at 760 (“The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depends
on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual’s interests in privacy and security are
weighed against society’s interests in conducting the procedure.”).
252. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014).
253. See id. This line of Fourth Amendment cases is limited to “seizures,” but blurs into a
closely related area of substantive due process—which may also implicate fairness. See County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998).
254. 471 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1985).
255. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–14, 13 n.11.
256. See id. at 14–15.
257. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8).
258. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
259. Cf. Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1119,
1124 (2008) (noting the need for “deontic constraints” as to police violence and ultimately
arguing for an imminence, necessity, and proportionality inquiry).
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seen, the principle of responsibility would not generally support the inflic-
tion of severe injuries or death. Nor would the protection principle typically
support the infliction of severe burdens on suspects, given that fleeing sus-
pects do not normally threaten other individuals. A contractualist approach
to fairness would thus clarify the proper means of accounting for the factors
listed in Graham, particularly “the severity of the crime at issue,” and
“whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others.”260
B. Collateral Burdens
Current doctrine often assumes that police should have the lawful abil-
ity to access any evidence or offenders that they can reliably locate, particu-
larly when they have a warrant.261 But that premise is too broad to be fair,
since innocent individuals can reasonably reject principles that categorically
sacrifice their personal interests for the sake of diffuse social goals, such as
prosecuting crime.262 Fairness thus directs our attention to the “collateral
burdens” imposed by police. To flesh out this point, we must again disman-
tle doctrinal categories and interrogate the moral justifications that come to
bear in different cases.
The principle of responsibility sometimes offers a basis for searching or
seizing suspects in ways that also burden third parties. For instance, ordering
one suspect to disclose information about another can be justified, if the
second person is also reasonably suspected of a crime, such as complicity.263
Historically, Fourth Amendment doctrine may have attended to this point
via the “mere evidence” rule,264 which permitted searches only where the
police had cause to believe that they would discover the fruits of crime,
instrumentalities of crime, or contraband.265 The mere evidence rule is often
characterized as a product of the nineteenth-century focus on property
rights.266 But it also played an underappreciated role in promoting fairness,
since criminal fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband tend to be in the
possession of persons who are themselves engaged in, and responsible for,
260. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The third listed Graham factor, “whether [the suspect] is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight,” id., should be relevant only to
the extent that it indirectly feeds into the factors identified in the main text.
261. See supra note 229.
262. See supra text accompanying note 70.
263. See supra Section II.A.
264. On the expansion and demise of the rule, see Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment
During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 Stan. L.
Rev. 555, 587–94 (1996), Donohue, supra note 33, at 1308–14, Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest
Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and
Seizure, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 50–53, 83–107 (2013), and Sina Kian, The Path of
the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and How the Court Re-
sponded, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 132, 166–74 (2012).
265. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). The Court abandoned the
mere evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
266. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 264, at 593.
1458 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1409
criminal activity. Echoes of the old rule persist in cases that emphasize
whether there is reason to believe that contraband is present, as opposed to
mere evidence of someone else’s unrelated offense.267 These cases exhibit a
troubling “guilt by association” assumption that could be dispelled by di-
rectly addressing third-party responsibility on a case-by-case basis.268
Other searches and seizures impose substantial burdens on third parties
who are not suspected of any crime. Take wiretaps that reveal intimate con-
versations with the suspect’s law-abiding family, or subpoenas to suspected
businesses that would disclose intimate details about both suspected and
unsuspected customers.269 In some cases, these incidental burdens are justifi-
able under one of the principles discussed above in Part II. For instance,
burdens on nonsuspect third parties could be justifiable under the protec-
tion principle, if the burdens were necessary and effective at reducing a spe-
cific risk of violent crime.270 And relatively small collateral burdens could be
justified by the principle of helpfulness.271 Sometimes, however, no fair prin-
ciple would justify the collateral burdens placed on nonsuspect third parties.
Current doctrine is largely uninterested in that fairness deficit.272
But if current Fourth Amendment doctrine is insufficiently attentive to
collateral burdens, some vitally important statutes, like the minimization re-
quirements for Title III wiretaps, have squarely addressed them.273 Courts
should recognize that, when it comes to nonsuspect third parties, the Fourth
Amendment itself demands similar efforts at minimization.274 Again, con-
tractualist reasoning points the way. A principle that prohibited all searches
or seizures that burdened nonsuspect third parties would objectionably pre-
clude protective law enforcement, including by encouraging dangerous
criminals to surround themselves with innocent parties as “investigative
shields.” A more auspicious principle would require police to minimize their
267. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981) (“Of prime importance in assess-
ing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent’s
house for contraband.”); see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (applying the Sum-
mers “contraband” rule); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (similar); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297 (1999) (similar).
268. See Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di
Re and the Fourth Amendment, 2003–2004 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 395, 395–97.
269. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
270. See supra Section II.B. This logic might justify some FISA orders under, for example,
50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
271. See supra Section II.E.
272. See generally Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1978) (rejecting spe-
cial protection for nonsuspects); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
273. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2012); cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482
n.11 (1976) (noting the importance of “care to assure that [searches] are conducted in a man-
ner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy”).
274. Courts sometimes controversially incorporate minimization concepts into the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 441–44 (9th Cir. 2016); Orin Kerr,
The Surprisingly Weak Reasoning of Mohamud, Lawfare (Dec. 23, 2016, 7:30 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/surprisingly-weak-reasoning-mohamud [https://perma.cc/6MNE-
FAWT] (criticizing Mohamud on doctrinal grounds).
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intrusions on nonsuspected third parties to the extent possible consistent
with due care. The idea here is to attend to the interests of bystanders who
are, in effect, caught up in the investigative melee.
For a doctrinally salient example of how a targeted search can burden
innocent third parties, consider searches of one person’s home based on a
desire to arrest a suspect who happens to be there. The Court has recognized
that this scenario poses a special problem, in that the Fourth Amendment
must attend to the “interests” and, yes, even the “perspective” of the nonsus-
pect homeowner:
In sum, two distinct interests were implicated by the search at issue here—
[the suspect’s] interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure and [the
host’s] interest in being free from an unreasonable search of his home.
Because the arrest warrant for [the suspect] addressed only the former in-
terest, the search of [the host’s] home was no more reasonable from [his]
perspective than it would have been if conducted in the absence of any
warrant.275
The Court’s solution to the problem of third-party burdens was simply to
require a third-party warrant: police may search a third party’s home upon
convincing a judge that a wanted offender can be found there.276 But while
warrants may be “reliable” gauges of suspicion and so may reduce the risk of
“abuse” by police officers,277 a warrant alone does not adequately respect the
interests of innocent third parties who happen to have criminal suspects (or
relevant evidence) in their homes.278 The mere fact that a suspect is in some-
one’s home—even if proven—does not necessarily make it fair to enter and
search that home.
Fairness suggests that more is required: rather than simply convincing a
magistrate that the suspect (or evidence) is present in a third party’s dwell-
ing, the police should have to justify any search or seizure burdening the
third party. The police could meet this burden by: (i) showing that the host
has himself committed a relevant crime, such as harboring a fugitive,
thereby triggering the principle of responsibility; (ii) asking the host for per-
mission to enter, as allowed by the principle of consent; (iii) demonstrating
that unconsented entry is necessary for protection; or (iv) directing the host
to ask that the suspect leave, thereby effectuating a disclosure pursuant to
the principle of helpfulness. What police cannot fairly do is ignore the inter-
ests of third parties whose homes happen to contain suspects or evidence.
275. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 (1981); see also id. at 213 (emphasizing
the need “to protect [the third party’s] privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable
invasion and search of his home”).
276. See id. at 213–15.
277. See id. at 213 (reasoning that “judicially untested determinations are not reliable
enough to justify an entry into a person’s home to arrest him without a warrant”).
278. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonable-
ness,” 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1642, 1680–81 (1998).
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C. Invidious Criteria
Even principles that are prima facie fair may have to bow in the face of
unusually strong grounds for rejection. The most intuitive and practically
important cases involve invidious, group-based search-and-seizure criteria
and so engender objectionable systematic effects. When present, these invid-
ious criteria render unfair what would otherwise be permissible searches and
seizures. Thus, all the principles of fairness discussed so far remain incom-
plete, until combined with a principle prohibiting use of invidious investiga-
tive criteria.
But first, let’s step back. We have seen that fairness sometimes demands
that police have certain reasons for action when they undertake searches and
seizures. However, police can act reasonably without being motivated by the
considerations that make their conduct reasonable. For example, contractu-
alism generally does not require that police correctly discern which legal
theories render their conduct reasonable.279 We might imagine a police of-
ficer who thinks, “I see someone driving over the speed limit, so I will pull
him over with the goal of addressing an imminent threat to public safety.”
This officer might be wrong that the protection principle justifies a stop in
this instance, given the improbability of future harm. Nonetheless, the of-
ficer would have observed an offense and so could have reasonable grounds
to act based on the principle of responsibility. The officer’s mistaken
thought processes might justify criticizing the officer or holding her ac-
countable. But requiring that the officer correctly glean the proper basis for
her actions would not afford innocent persons any greater protection, and
insistence on police perfection would create windfalls for wrongdoers. This
default indifference to police motivation aligns with the case law, which fo-
cuses on objectively available reasons for action.280
Yet some motives are invidious, such that any principle allowing for
them would be subject to reasonable rejection. The most obvious example is
racial animus—that is, a belief that certain racial groups are in some respect
different from others and so should, as a group, be subjected to greater
search-and-seizure burdens. We have already seen a related point—namely,
that population-based racial profiles are wrong independent and therefore
cannot support searches and seizures pursuant to the principle of responsi-
bility.281 But that analysis was concerned only with showing the limits of
when the principle of responsibility applies. The question here is both
279. See Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, supra note 16, at 52 (focusing on “what it is
reasonable for the agent to believe in the situation”); Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16,
at 219–20.
280. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]he fact that the officer
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circum-
stances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” (discussing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973))). The key doctrinal exception pertains to “programmatic searches.” See supra text
accompanying note 167.
281. See supra text accompanying note 118.
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deeper and broader: where responsibility or some other justificatory princi-
ple admittedly does apply, do search-and-seizure principles nonetheless gen-
erate unfairness when they allow for police action predicated on views of
racial difference?
The answer is yes: a principle that allows for searches and seizures based
on a general view of racial differences would be subject to reasonable rejec-
tion, since it would compel members of socially disfavored racial groups to
suffer systematically greater burdens relative to other groups. This claim
rests on the idea that race differences are distinctive (though not unique) in
that they implicate and exacerbate broader historical and social patterns of
discrimination. As Scanlon has argued, “individual acts of discrimination on
certain grounds,” including racial differences, “become impermissible be-
cause they support and maintain” broader social practices of unfair discrim-
ination.282 And “[n]o one can be asked to accept a society that marks them
out as inferior.”283 Racial criteria are thus invidious—and subject to reasona-
ble rejection—in a way that many other modes of group differentiation,
such as differential treatment for children or for one’s friends, generally are
not. Scanlon also identifies a second basis for reasonable rejection of racial-
ized criteria: because of race’s distinctive social meaning, a race-conscious
search-and-seizure criterion would communicate a message of group inferi-
ority, and that message might itself inflict an unjustified harm on affected
persons.284 These two related grounds for reasonable rejection are what
make racial generalizations an invidious and unfair basis for conducting
searches and seizures.
To illustrate how the prohibition on invidious criteria should constrain
police justifications, imagine an officer who observes many vehicles violating
criminal traffic laws but chooses to stop only drivers of a single racial
group.285 A principle that authorized that course of action would find some
initial support in notions of responsibility, since the detained individuals
would reasonably be suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Yet the officer’s ac-
tion would still be unfair. Again, a principle that tolerated such race-based
criteria for assigning investigative burdens would be subject to reasonable
rejection by any individual who would consequently experience the adverse
effects of a racial caste system. That compounding of preexisting discrimina-
tory patterns is what makes racism an invidious mode of assigning personal
burdens and a basis for reasonable rejection. By contrast, a principle that
allowed police to follow enforcement priorities or choose among offenders
via a lottery could be fair.286 So would a principle that demanded that all
offenders be stopped.287
282. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, supra note 16, at 73.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 74. These concerns do not apply to some race-based criteria. See id.
285. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 336
n.19 (1998) (discussing “the offense of DWB, driving while black” (cleaned up)).
286. See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 113 (defending randomization).
287. See Kennedy, supra note 133, at 159–61.
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The idea that the Fourth Amendment should prohibit racially motivated
law enforcement contradicts Whren v. United States.288 There, black defend-
ants argued in part “that police officers might decide which motorists to
stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s
occupants.”289 A unanimous Court responded that “the constitutional basis
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”290 But intentional discrimi-
nation can surely violate more than one legal rule at a time. And, on its face,
the language of the Fourth Amendment seems to bar racist searches and
seizures—the epitome of “unreasonable” police behavior. That intuition, we
have now seen, is borne out by contractualist considerations of fairness.
By drawing attention to this point and incorporating it into a broader
theory of the Fourth Amendment, contractualist reasoning opens up new
doctrinal approaches to racial discrimination in law enforcement. Once in-
formed by considerations of fairness, the Fourth Amendment can afford
greater or different protections against governmental racism than the more
broadly applicable Equal Protection Clause.291 Assume that the Court is cor-
rect to hold, or will not change its mind, that pure disparate impact claims
should not be cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.292 Even so, evi-
dence of systematic disparate impact in criminal investigation would some-
times demonstrate unfairness and so generate Fourth Amendment
violations. Again, we have seen that fairness attends to the perspectives of
any reasonable objector, not just to the perspective of police.293 Thus, a prin-
ciple allowing for systematically disadvantaging a racial or other group can
be a basis for reasonable rejection, even if no individual police officer has
acted in a morally blameworthy fashion.294 That point bears repeating: when
a racial group suffers systematically disproportionate burdens, there are
grounds for reasonable rejection even if no individual police officer is
blameworthy.
Some might argue that the foregoing reasoning should lead to more
radical results, since invidious criteria are always operative in the criminal
justice system as it currently exists. For instance, implicit bias might system-
atically skew enforcement decisions to the disadvantage of certain racial
groups, and historical discrimination might echo through time in ways that
288. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
289. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
290. Id. at 813.
291. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (constraining state laws generally).
292. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
293. See supra Section I.C. Again, “searches” and “seizures”—not police—can be found
“unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
294. See Carbado, supra note 65, at 1031 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s conceptualization of
racial profiling as a problem of motivation or conscious racial intentionality, rather than as a
material harm that affects a person’s privacy and sense of security, positions racial profiling
beyond the doctrinal reach of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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likewise burden certain groups more than others.295 Given these concerns,
are all principles authorizing searches and seizures necessarily subject to rea-
sonable rejection and therefore unfair? No, because to object to all principles
allowing for any searches and seizures would itself be unreasonable: given
the important role of the criminal justice system, many individuals could
reasonably reject principles that would debilitate or preclude police
investigation.296
Yet the systemic concerns just noted are critically relevant to whether
search-and-seizure principles are subject to reasonable rejection. To accom-
modate those concerns, the Fourth Amendment should require that police
engage safeguards that minimize the effects of background social facts, in-
cluding racial discrimination, that generate unfairness.297 For instance, non-
emergency searches and seizures might be deemed reasonable only if the
relevant police department has undergone implicit bias training and re-
corded information about its discretionary actions for later judicial re-
view.298 To the extent that these or other policies have lasting and cumulative
effects, a Fourth Amendment of fairness would mark out a path toward
greater racial equality.
Conclusion
Contractualism offers a useful, deontological way to reason about rea-
sonableness. Drawing on that philosophical approach, this Article has out-
lined a number of principles that describe the basic features of Fourth
Amendment fairness. But all of these principles are necessarily tentative and
incomplete. Precisely because it is a mode of reasoning, Fourth Amendment
contractualism does not insist on any fixed code of rules, so much as invite
continued engagement of our moral powers.
295. See L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 Ind. L.J.
1143, 1147 (2012) (discussing implicit bias and police discretion).
296. See Scanlon, What We Owe, supra note 16, at 236 (noting that it is not reasonable
to eliminate all possible harm, given the need for some risky action).
297. See Richardson, supra note 295, at 1172–77.
298. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
